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Abstract
Is global democracy declining? This is a question many have argued over, leading
to multiple, oftentimes contradictory, answers regarding causes and potential solutions.
This thesis seeks to explore the question of democratic decline by analyzing changes over
time in public opinion survey data in three states- New Zealand, Turkey, and the United
States- looking specifically at how the government has balanced the tradeoff between
security and civil liberties in the post-9/11 world. I argue that long-term government
prioritization of security over freedoms has eroded support for fundamental democratic
norms, as citizens willingly accept restrictions to their rights in exchange for a sense of
security, causing gradual democratic decline. The evidence from an analysis of survey
data over the past ten years supports this theory, with New Zealand emerging as a bestcase scenario that always prioritized freedom, and remains a strong democracy, Turkey as
a worst-case scenario that strongly supported security over all else and quickly
transitioned away from the fledgling democracy they were into full autocracy, and the US
gradually, and worryingly, slipping deeper into hybridity with enduring restrictions on
civil rights. Further, the gap between citizen perceptions of the abstract and reality of
democracy appears to be growing, resulting in a general inability (or unwillingness)
among citizens to see an increase in security policy as counter to democracy, in either an
abstract or practical sense, despite evidence that expanding security is balanced out by a
decrease in freedoms. While not the only factor leading to democratic decline,
government prioritization of security policy over civil liberties has long term
consequences for democratic survival and serious implications for the future.

i

Acknowledgments
It took a village to get this project off the ground, and there are so many
wonderful people whose support and guidance I am so grateful for. The entire political
science department at PSU has been an incredible support system, particularly in such a
crazy year that required so much change and flexibility, A very special thanks goes to
professor Valdini for her endless support and encouragement and introducing to me a
love for comparative political systems I didn’t know I had- this thesis would have never
seen daylight if not for you. Also, a huge thanks goes to Professor Yeşilada for a great
deal of assistance with research methods and design and for all his advice on how best to
narrow down and solidify my ideas into researchable arguments. My cohort as well
deserves a special thanks for the constant guidance and discussion, not to mention the
much-needed friendship and board game nights. Thanks to my friends, near and far, for
encouragement and positive affirmation throughout this entire year; with extra love and
gratitude to J, R, and L for the weekend adventures and the free use of their Wi-Fi when
mine decided to stop working (multiple times!). Love and thanks as well to N and T for
happily reading my first draft and offering so much helpful advice and reassurance, and
to C for calming my nerves as my defense loomed. Finally, to my family for unending
support and encouragement and for instilling in me from a very young age a deep passion
for the pursuit of knowledge- I love you all, thank you.

ii

Table of Contents
Abstract ............................................................................................................i
Acknowledgments.......................................................................................... ii
List of Tables .................................................................................................iv
List of Figures ................................................................................................. v
Abbreviations .................................................................................................vi

Chapter I: Introduction .................................................................................... 1
Chapter II: Literature Review ......................................................................... 5
Chapter III: Research Design ........................................................................ 24
Data......................................................................................................... 26
Measurements ......................................................................................... 28
Chapter IV: Case Studies .............................................................................. 34
New Zealand ........................................................................................... 36
United States ........................................................................................... 44
Turkey ..................................................................................................... 52
Chapter V: Data Analysis ............................................................................. 61
Democracy and Freedom ........................................................................ 61
Terrorism and Security ........................................................................... 82
Regression Analysis ................................................................................ 90
Chapter VI: Discussion ................................................................................. 98
Chapter VII: Conclusion ............................................................................. 110

References ................................................................................................... 122
Appendix A: Regressions and P-Values ..................................................... 129
Appendix B: Graphs of Full Data ............................................................... 133

iii

List of Tables
Table 1- Framework for Measuring Political Support .......................................................29
Table 2- Relationship Between Importance of Democracy and Security vs. Freedom .....92
Table 3- Relationship Between Importance of Democracy and Security in
Neighborhood ........................................................................................................93
Table 4- Relationship Between Importance of Democracy and Worry of a Terrorist
Attack .....................................................................................................................93
Table 5- Relationship Between Perceived Democraticness of Country and Freedom vs.
Security ..................................................................................................................95
Table 6- Relationship Between Perceived Democraticness of Country and Security in
Neighborhood ........................................................................................................95
Table 7- Relationship Between Perceived Democraticness of Country and Worry of a
Terrorist Attack ......................................................................................................96

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1- Importance of Democracy ................................................................................ 63
Figure 2- “Democraticness” of Own Country ................................................................. 64
Figure 3- Support for Having a Democratic Political System ......................................... 66
Figure 4- Satisfaction with Current Political System ...................................................... 67
Figure 5- National Pride Over Time ................................................................................ 69
Figure 6- Confidence in Government .............................................................................. 70
Figure 7- Support for Having A Strong Leader ............................................................... 72
Figure 8- Confidence in Parliament ................................................................................. 75
Figure 9- Confidence in Parties ....................................................................................... 75
Figure 10- Essential Characteristics of Democracy: Civil Rights ................................... 81
Figure 11- Essential Characteristics of Democracy: Elections ........................................ 81
Figure 12- Essential Characteristics of Democracy: Gender Equality ............................ 81
Figure 13-Which is More Important: Freedom vs. Security ............................................ 83
Figure 14- Feelings of Security in Neighborhood ........................................................... 85
Figure 15- Worries of a Terrorist Attack ......................................................................... 86

v

Abbreviations

AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
DHKP/C: Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (Revolutionary People’s Liberation
Party Front)
EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit
ESS: European Social Survey
GTI: Global Terrorism Index
HDP: Halkların Demokratik Partisi (People’s Democratic Party)
ISIL: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as ISIS or Daesh)
MiT: Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Organization)
PKK: Partîya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Worker’s Party)
SDF: Syrian Democratic Forces
TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
USA PATRIOT Act: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
WVS: World Values Survey
YPG: Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Units)

vi

CHAPTER I
Introduction
Is the world truly experiencing a widespread decline of democracy? While the
scope and seriousness of this phenomenon remain contested, it seems nearly certain that
change of some sort is occurring. According to Freedom House, there are currently fewer
democracies in the world than at any point in the organization’s existence and 2020
marked the 15th consecutive year of a general decline in global freedom. These
concerning trends, marked by the rise of strongman autocrats across the globe and
weakening support for democracy in key regions are very worrying for the long-term
survival of democracy. There have been, of course, many attempts to explain this
phenomenon and to offer potential solutions to stop the supposed decline, but, as it is
such a multifaceted and ever evolving issue, there has been no definite consensus as to
causes or even an agreement on if decline is truly happening. Most existing studies into
democratic survival focus on the political actors (almost exclusively elite-centric), on
autocratic states’ role in exporting authoritarianism, or on institutional and economic
factors. These are then juxtaposed with a number of other authors who argue that this
threat of decline is in fact overexaggerated, leaving us with a very murky pool of
contradictions that encompasses the vast field of democratic survival.
Democracy as a concept is already a tricky one, understood differently based on
context and intended usage, although very generally defined as meaning “government by
the people” (OED). Interestingly enough, while any average citizen could probably
recognize the key ingredient of “the people” to a democracy, until recently there have
been relatively few analyses that actually explore the role of citizens in democratic
1

strength. In the academic world, stemming all the way back to the time of Plato, it was
simply an accepted fact that public support is critical for a democracy, without much
empirical evidence to back up this claim. While this has begun to change in the past few
years, there remain many more avenues available for further research into the actual
affect public support, and the loss or gain of it, has on long-term democratic survival.
Public support for democracy rises and falls for many reasons, some normal fluctuations,
and others with lasting effects, but an important and relatively unexplored field is the
effect government security policy has on democratic values.
Since the devastating attacks in America on September 11, 2001, global
governments have swiftly transitioned to prioritizing security over civil liberties,
ostensibly because of the growing threat of terror related activity, and quite often with
general public approval. In the tradeoff between security and civil liberty, it seems most
often security wins out as citizens are very willing to accept restrictions on freedoms if
this comes with a promise of safety. However, because commitment to protecting and
upholding civil liberties and freedoms is a foundation of democracy, this raises question
of if public approval of security prioritization has long-term effects on public support for
these democratic norms. Thus, the question driving this research is: How has a global
prioritizing of security over freedom and civil liberties in the post-9/11 world affected
citizen support for democratic norms?
If democratic decline is indeed occurring (which I will later argue it selectively
is), understanding the factors that may be driving this decline is crucial to slowing or
reversing this trend. If we are to combat rising autocracy we must first address possible
causes for its endurance and continued growth. The increased security environment of the
2

21st century potentially has further answers as to why democratic decline persists, and
thus presents an important avenue for research. While a number of prior studies have
indicated people are overwhelmingly comfortable giving up some freedoms in exchange
for safety, these have primarily focused on the United States in the immediate aftermath
of the 9/11 attacks, and thus there is opportunity to expand and broaden these arguments
for a more comparative perspective over a greater time period. Critical to this analysis is
how public opinion has shifted over time, as the prioritization of security has persisted in
many states since the attacks on 9/11, despite a decrease in the actual threat of terrorism.
If the prioritization of security is found to decrease citizen support for fundamental
norms, and this has remained steady government policy for the past decade, this could
have much broader implications for the hopes of democratic survival. Furthermore, if this
loss of support is due to citizens willingly giving up rights they view as unimportant or
unnecessary, rather than out of apathy or frustration, this paints a worrying picture of the
future existence of these fundamental norms.
Previous authors have recognized a gap or deficit between citizens evaluations of
the performance of their democracy and their perception of the ideal of democracy but
have overwhelmingly found no need to worry about this “democratic paradox” (Dahl,
2000). However, due to a continuously negative view of performance, coupled with a
persistent fear of terrorism, it seems a spillover has begun to occur as the fundamental
norms themselves are beginning to be questioned or turned away from. Even the ideal of
democracy is losing support in citizen evaluations, indicating that there is certainly more
going on than a normal fluctuation in performance evaluation of the incumbent
government. Using New Zealand, Turkey, and the United States as case studies this
3

analysis examines how support for these fundamental norms has changed over the past
decade and explores the governments’ security prioritization as a potential cause for the
differences we can observe in the outcomes of these three cases.
With that goal, this thesis begins with a review of the very rich field of literature
on public opinion and democratic decline before moving into an explanation of the
method of analysis, data, and measurements used for this project. From there I offer a
detailed summary of the current status of terrorism and democracy in Turkey, New
Zealand, and the United States, and then present my analysis of survey data gathered
from the World Values Survey, focusing initially on indicators related to freedom and
civil liberties and then tying in measures of terrorism and security. Finally, I conclude
with a discussion of what patterns this analysis has revealed as well as the implications
and significance of this project and avenues for further research.
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CHAPTER II
Literature Review
The study of democratic decline is a rich field, which has only grown richer in
recent years, producing a wide range of voices and explanations for what we are seeing in
the world today. Arguments for democratic decline generally fall into four (relatively
flexible) categories: those focusing on the role of elites and elected officials in causing a
backslide, those that focus on autocratic regimes exporting their influence across borders,
those that encompass the very broad field of economic factors, and those that focus more
specifically on institutions and norms. These are, of course, very general categories and
many previous works can be classified as falling into more than one, as most discuss a
mixture of factors and situations that may cause democratic decline, although all
generally put the ultimate blame on one specific factor or cause. Important to recognize
right away however, are the explanations that are often left out or overlooked,
particularly in this case, the critical role public opinion plays.
Some of the most prominent arguments in the field focus almost entirely on the
role of actors in bringing about or causing this democratic backslide, in direct or indirect
ways, however they most often center on political elite alone. In setting the stage for
these arguments Juan Linz (1978) argued that all democratic regimes have the same
reasonable chance of survival, but certain characteristics of relevant actors (both
individuals and institutions) decrease the probability of this development and increase the
probability of breakdown. This is expanded on by Ziblatt and Levitsky (2018) who argue
that democracy fails because the democratically elected leaders gradually subvert
democratic norms and use the regime’s own institutions to slowly pull it apart. Likewise,
5

Applebaum (2020) notes that political elites use emotive and manipulative strategies
grounded in a “restorative nostalgia,” to help promote an easy transition away from
democracy by making citizens fear for their safety and stability (56). In general, these
arguments see elite actors as opportunistic and self-interested, using every tool at their
disposal to consolidate power, regardless of how it may hurt democracy. There are also
those like Klaas (2017) who notes that, while elites are responsible for this backslide, it is
somewhat unintentional as western governments put short-term economic interests over
long-term foreign policy goals. Diamond et al (2016) meanwhile take the blame off of
democratic political elites entirely and put it on existing autocracies themselves for
“taking coordinated and decisive action” to contain and rollback democracy on a global
level (4).
Diamond, like many other scholars of democratic decline and conflict [Przewoski
(2005), Klaas (2017), Tilly (1978), Raskin (1976), Pavlovic (2019)] assumes that one of
the primary causes of democracy “losing its luster” can be traced back to the perception
among many that advanced democracies are in trouble due to economic inequality and
other economic concerns. Whether looking at the 2008 financial crisis and its lingering
consequences (Diamond 2015, Diamond 2016), Western government’s putting short-term
economic goals above long-term foreign policy goals (Klaas 2017), or the rising danger
of capitalism (Raskin 1976), a common thread in the literature is the deep ties between
democracy and state wealth. Adam Przeworksi (2005) perhaps stated it most clearly with
his bold claim that “democracy always survives when a society is sufficiently
developed,” and “constitutions are neither necessary nor sufficient for democracy to
survive;” it’s ultimately all about the state’s per capita income (265).
6

As should be clear just from this brief overview, democratic decline is a heavily
researched field, yet one with little consensus as to cause. It’s quite likely, as others have
noted, that a mixture of factors is ultimately responsible, and each case study has the
potential to reveal more variables worth examining. It seems reasonable to assume that
“ambivalent and indecisive policies of leaders have often been a major factor in the
probability of breakdown” (Linz 1978, 13), but just as reasonable to assume that a lack of
state wealth or fundamental institutions have a role to play as well. There are also
countless other explanations in existence, many that echo or expand on each other, and
many others beside that contradict one another. It is notable however, that, while we all
understand democracy to be “rule by the people,” there are comparatively fewer studies
looking at the potential role of public opinion in democratic decline or consolidation.
This is a confusing oversight, as nearly all the above-mentioned studies acknowledge
public support or the role of people in some form or another, yet none chose to focus on it
specifically as a cause or to fully examine the effect this variable may have.
Although it has been recognized as an important factor since the time of Plato,
only in recent years has public opinion seriously been examined in terms of democratic
strength and survival. Further, while it is generally acknowledged that public opinion is
important for democratic survival, researchers disagree on the extent of this importance,
leading to frequent contradictions in the literature. Until very recently, the idea of
political support was simply assumed to be important, with very little empirical evidence
to back this up, due primarily to the fact that the data required for these sorts of analyses
were very difficult to obtain and required large, nationally representative public opinion
surveys. Within the past two decades more in-depth waves of the World Values Survey
7

and regional Democracy Barometer datasets have allowed for greater analysis of public
opinion, however these studies still often came to inconsistent conclusions. For instance,
in 2003, using the 4th wave of the World Value Survey, Ronald Inglehart found public
support to be modestly and positively correlated with democracy, and again in 2005,
along with Welzel, found the same positive association, even when controlling for the
number of years a regime was under democracy. In contrast however, Hadenius and
Teorell (2005) and Welzel (2007) found that support has little to no relationship with
subsequent democracy once you adjust for the initial level of regime democracy. In 2010,
controlling for a number of different variables, Fails and Pierce found no evidence that
support is associated with democratization or democratic survival. Similarly, Qi and Shin
(2011) show that the level of public support for democracy is not associated with
subsequent democratization when controlling for prior democracy, but the level of
“critical support” is.
A recent study by Christopher Claassen (2020) seeks to remedy the confusion
over the contribution citizen support has on democracy by producing a very broad
empirical analysis of public opinion. Noting the limitations of relying on smaller datasets
(as most previous works had done), Claassen’s analysis utilizes a significantly larger pool
of data- 1,390 nationally representative public opinion surveys, gathered by 14 different
survey projects in 150 countries over a period of 30 years- and then creates a dynamic
Bayesian latent variable model to combine all the pieces into one cohesive measure of
support. He ultimately determined that classic theory on democratic strength is correct:
public opinion helps democracy survive and if support is low emerging democracies may
fail to consolidate or even descend into autocracy. Furthermore, the evidence he finds
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also indicates that declining support for democracy among the public can affect even the
most established western democracies, weakening their legitimacy (Claassen 2020).
While this analysis doesn’t necessarily lead to any unexpected results, it provides strong
empirical evidence and justification for the assumptions most other works simply make,
and thus serves as an important path to connect my findings on public opinion to the
broader question of democratic legitimacy.
Thanks to Claassen and some of these other scholars, we can safely conclude that
public support is an important part of democratic strength, but there still exists a need to
understand the why and how. Even before the existence of empirical evidence, most
previous works in this field chose to analyze case studies or specific scenarios to
determine what possible variables, factors and situations may cause public support for
democracy to decline. Robbins and Tessler (2012) use survey data to examine the effect
of elections and find that when people support candidates, platforms, or parties that are
excluded from elections, or when they perceive of the elections as unfree or unfair, their
support for democracy will decrease. When institutions are seen as corrupt or unfair,
general attitudes towards democracy will decline, particularly in nondemocracies or
hybrid regimes where citizens may be experiencing elements of the democratic process
for the first time, allowing attitudes towards democracy to vary as a function of the
perception of these experiences. As they note, for democracy to consolidate and survive
all actors must believe that “the democratic regime is most right and appropriate for their
society” and “better than any other realistic alternative” (Robbins and Tessler 2012,
1256).
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Similarly, through a detailed exploration of Latin American democracy, Steven
Levitsky (2018) finds that the structural characteristics of states and politics are eroding
public support for democracy, leading to declining legitimacy in the region. The three
main characteristics explored in this analysis are: the persistent and extreme levels of
social inequality, general state weakness leading to inability to uphold rule of law or tax
effectively, and widespread party weakness as corruption, scandal and numerous policy
failures have eroded partisan identities and encouraged voting against the political
establishment (Levitsky 2018, 103). These structural characteristics combined have
rapidly increased public discontent and created the perception that elected officials are
not responsive to ordinary citizens, don’t care about providing essential public goods, and
are likely to be involved in numerous self-serving scandals. Therefore, even while more
of the region is democratic than ever before, overwhelmingly the public are not happy
with these regimes and this has caused many citizens to hold lower views of democratic
norms and values in general as they no longer view democracy as the “only game in
town” (Robbins and Tessler 2012, 1256). Levitsky’s findings are essential, for they
emphasize the fact that these changes in public opinion can be long-term, rather than just
an immediate response to a specific event such as an election or natural disaster.
It's also important to note that, in spite of the existing evidence, there are some
scholars who disagree on the extent that public support is actually critical to democratic
survival. In his examination of the 4th wave of the World Values Survey (1999-2001)
Inglehart (2003) concluded that, although lip service to democracy was almost universal,
“it is not necessarily an accurate indicator of how deeply democracy has taken root in a
given country” (51). Like Levitsky and Robbins and Tessler, his focus is primarily on the
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establishment of institutions, although he differs in his approach to public support.
Inglehart’s key finding is essentially that institutions are crucial to survival and that
public support for democracy is a necessary condition for their establishment, but it is not
sufficient unless a wide range of other variables are also in place. Thus, just because
public support exists, doesn’t necessarily mean the democracy is healthy. This conclusion
contrasts interestingly with that of Robbins and Tessler (2012) who also argue that
democratic institutions are critical to democratic survival, however, ultimately conclude
that institutions and public support go hand in hand and survival is only possible with
both bolstering each other. They see institutions and public support as more of a
hardware/software relationship, rather than see institutions as the ultimate end goal for
survival and public support as simply one of the variables that bring them about (Robbins
and Tessler 2012, 1256). Therefore, while both agree public support is important, Robins
and Tessler view it as a much more crucial part of the equation than Inglehart who views
it more as a means of bringing about the intended institutional goals.
Others choose to look beyond the effect structural and political factors may have
on public opinion, and instead focus on events or scenarios beyond the control of actors
or groups. In this area, one of the most frequently cited explanation for public opinion
changes are crises and their aftermaths, as it’s long been recognized that shocks to a
system can spark major changes or disruptions in society. The argument here is that,
when crises overwhelm states, they can damage democratic legitimacy as decreasing
public opinion of regime response or management can “spur polarizing and possibly
violent political and social conflicts; embolden cavalier political leaders who disregard
checks and balances or remove elected rivals by unconstitutional means; and/or fuel
11

public acquiescence to a ‘gradual erosion of political rights and civil liberties’” (Norris
1999, quoted in Carlin et al 2014, 3). These “shocks” to the system range from economic
downturns, to security threats, to domestic uprising or rebellion, to natural disaster, and
even to much more localized disruptions such as crime waves (Carlin et al 2014). Carlin
et al analyzed the effects of the devastating 2010 earthquake on Chilean public opinion to
see whether an “act of god” could still undermine support for the democratic rules of the
game. Through an analysis of national survey data, they found that, as expected, the
natural disaster and the damage resulting from it strongly decreased victims’ specific
support for their municipal governments. More worryingly however, they also found that
this negatively affected victims’ support for broader democratic norms and values, in
particular they were more supportive of military and executive coups and less politically
tolerant (4). Therefore crisis, either man-made or acts of nature, can be seen to have a
strong negative effect on public opinion, not only towards the incumbent government, but
towards the foundations of the regime itself.
These findings, and those of others who’ve examined the effect of crisis on public
opinion in democracy, could reasonably be extended to my question, for terror attacks
and threats certainly fall into the overarching category of national crisis. If the response
of governments towards disaster has ultimately been found to decrease victims’ support
for broader democratic values, it seems plausible to apply this same logic to acts of terror.
It is true, as many have noted before, that terrorist acts often produce a “rally-round-theflag” effect wherein there is a “temporary burst of government popularity,” (Norris 2011,
15), but how do these attitudes persist over time? It’s well established that citizens are
relatively pro-government and pro-security in the aftermath of a terrorist attack and
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therefore more open to potentially right-restricting policy (see Davis and Silver 2004),
but the longer-term effects are what I’m most interested in here. How does citizen
attitude and support for these policies change as time passes, and what long-term effect
does this have on the strength of the regime? There seems to be a dearth in the literature
examining how terrorism and the resulting government policy affects public opinion in
the long run, and thus this analysis will attempt a comparison across several waves of
public opinion survey data to help find an answer to this question. It will also become
important to distinguish if support for democracy is decreasing because people are
supportive of the government’s prioritizing and think security is more important than
civil liberties or if it’s that support for democracy is decreasing because people are not
supportive of the government’s prioritizing and become disenchanting with the whole
system as a result. In other words, is it acceptance or apathy?
A small bed of research exists looking directly at the effect terror attacks have on
public opinion, with some very interesting findings, although unfortunately nearly all
these studies focus very specifically on the United States in the immediate aftermath of
9/11. Jackson (2005) examines the language of the US “war on terror” to argue that it
was “carefully and deliberately constructed” in a way “to make the war seem reasonable,
responsible and inherently ‘good’” (147). This served to normalize and legitimize
counter-terrorism institutional practices, but also poses severe challenges to the healthy
functioning of a democratic society by narrowing civic culture and political life while
creating a general moral panic. By deliberately constructing a very real fear of terrorism
among the public the government was encouraging individuals to give the “war” their full
support and thus fully accept limits on their civil liberties if meant they would be safe.
13

This is demonstrated perfectly in Davis and Silver’s 2004 study that found Americans to
be overwhelmingly willing to trade some civil liberties for greater personal safety.
Ultimately, their findings indicate that Americans’ commitment to democratic values is
highly contingent on other concerns and that the context of large-scale threats to national
or personal security can induce a substantial willingness to give up rights (Davis and
Silver 2004). Basically, Americans care more about their safety than civil liberties and
will happily make this tradeoff in the name of security, with greater support relative to
the degree of perceived threat. Furthermore, when you consider Jackson’s findings that
this intense fear and sense of threat was purposely cultivated and constructed by political
actors to justify their actions, this trade off becomes a little more worrying in the longterm context.
The idea that this intense fear and sense of threat was purposely cultivated by
political elite to justify their actions was also examined by Baker’s 2003 study that found
civil liberties in the US were increasingly seen as a vulnerability after the 9/11 attacks. In
the aftermath of the attacks many markers of an open, free society- free press and speech,
privacy from government, individual protection in criminal proceedings, etc.- were
suddenly transformed into opportunities for the enemy to do us harm and thus their
restriction was not only a byproduct of this tradeoff but a very specific goal (Baker 2003,
563). Jackson and Baker would thus agree that elite manipulation and framing post-9/11
created a very strong environment of fear, giving them greater leeway to pass and justify
policy restricting civil liberties. And Davis and Silver would note that, at least in regard
to the US, citizens were generally accepting and even happy with this prioritization, for
they recognized their safety as ultimately more important than freedom. While these
14

findings are critical to my analysis, they all focus on the immediate aftermath of the 9/11
attacks, and thus still leave us with the question of if these attitudes persist in the longterm.
Before diving too deeply into the debate between security and freedom, it’s
necessary to note that not all authors agree that democracy is in fact in danger, and an
important subfield in the literature argues that there is currently not a legitimacy crisis of
democracy, and no real evidence of declining support for democracy. Authors such as
Weßels (2015), Norris (2011), Thomassen and van Ham (2017), and Ferrín and Kriesi
(2016) focus on public opinion but all essentially argue that, while evaluations of
democratic performance are decreasing, this must be differentiated from perceptions of
democratic norms, which remain stable. Basically, these works all recognize that there is
a gap between norms and practice of democracy, and just because support for regime
performance is decreasing doesn’t mean support for the fundamental norms and values
that underlie it are. This is reflective of Robert Dahl’s (2000) “democratic paradox,”
wherein citizens think of democracy in two different ways: as “an ideal to be attained”
and as “a set of actual practices and institutions” (Dahl 2000, 37). Thus, according to
Dahl, it is in no way surprising that citizens can be both dissatisfied with democracy and
value its ideals simultaneously, a trend that has been exposed countless times over the
past 20 years. In analyzing democratic decline then, it becomes important to look at how
citizens understand and define democracy in general while also looking at how they
evaluate their own regime, for, many would argue, as long as the actual foundations of
democracy remain strong, we need not overly fear widespread democratic decline.
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In an examination of the strength of these democratic foundations, Norris (2011)
confidently concludes that the worry of democratic decline has been greatly overstated.
In her challenge of the conventional diagnosis of legitimacy crisis, she notes that this
“crisis myth, while fashionable, exaggerates the extent of political dissatisfaction and too
often falls into the dangers of fact free hyperbole” (241). She focuses on the idea of a
“democratic deficit,” which explores this same concept of a gap existing between
satisfaction with the performance of democracy and public aspirations towards these
norms and values. However, unlike some of her contemporaries, Norris ultimately
doesn’t see the existence of this gap as potentially ominous and notes the greatest
possible causality of this democratic deficit being negative consequences for political
activism and future democratization (Norris 2011, 8). Thus, while there are certainly
consequences of this deficit that need to be addressed to maintain the long-term health of
the democracy, they aren’t necessarily dire.
Likewise, Thomassen and van Ham (2017) argue that exaggeration is rampant in
discussions of the strength of democratic legitimacy. They note that current data provides
no evidence of an actual legitimacy crisis because there is no consistent decline in public
support and, furthermore, there exists a great deal of variation both between countries and
over time. They also discuss another, more straightforward reason to doubt this “story of
democratic malaise” being the simple fact that this concept is “anything but new”
(Thomassen and van Ham 2017, 3) Since the 60s crisis theories of democracy appear
regularly, often blaming different factors and complexities of modern society, and yet,
despite all this doom and gloom, a complete breakdown of democracy has not yet
occurred in any of the older, more established democracies. Thus, they are in agreement
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with Norris that, yes legitimacy is crucial to regime survival, and yes, “critical citizens”
may indicate the rise of a democratic deficit between satisfaction and aspirations, but
ultimately legitimacy itself is not in danger and the “crisis myth” has been blown way out
of proportion.
Thomassen and van Ham do acknowledge that a regime requires stable and high
level of support to survive, but even if this support declines, it will do little to weaken
legitimacy unless this dissatisfaction persists for long periods of time and shifts away
from authorities to the political regime as a whole (a conclusion somewhat more
consistent with a classic Easton framework for understanding political support1).
Therefore, they argue a legitimacy crisis is only a possibility when: 1. Political support is
lacking for political institutions and the political regime (rather than the incumbent
political authorities) and 2. Levels of political support follow a trend of continuous
decline rather than fluctuation (Thomassen and van Ham 2017, 6). Based on current
evidence then, they very confidently assert that there is no imminent crisis of legitimacy
and public opinion for democracy fluctuates slightly but ultimately remains stable.
Working with these same ideas of a democratic paradox, Weßels (2015) and
Ferrín et al (2016) explore this potential deficit by looking specifically at Europe, using
data from Round 6 of the European Social Survey, conducted in 2012. Ferrín et al very
specifically want to know if democracy remains a universal value for Europeans and how
legitimate citizens perceive their own regimes’ to be. Noting that democracy is a
“multidimensional concept” inherently hard to measure, the authors examine evaluations

1

Easton’s framework for understanding public support, while incredibly influential, has been heavily
criticized and revised upon since its publication; see below for more explanation
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of a broad list of attributes covering a wide range of principles people may associate with
democracy, based on three different “versions of democracy”- liberal, social, and direct
(Ferrín et al 2016, 3). Working off of Easton they recognize that public support “is
fundamental to ensure the stability of the different objects of the political system, namely:
the political community, the political regime, and the political authorities” (Easton 1965,
9), however they believe a more subtle conceptualization is required for such an
important idea. Easton’s theory suggests that there is crossover and shifts between these
dimensions, with both positive and negative spillover possible as support for the
performance of authorities can lead to decreased or increased support for the regime.
It’s necessary to note here that Easton’s framework, while undeniably important
and influential, is quite complex, and thus has proven incredibly difficult to
operationalize, leading most researchers to create simplified or more nuanced versions. In
order to properly operationalize the full framework, you would have to distinguish
between the three different objects of support (authorities, regime, and community),
between specific and diffuse support, and between three different sources of support
(long-term utility, moral norms, short-term utility) (Thomassen and van Ham 2017).
Furthermore, one of the biggest downfalls of Easton’s original outline is that the
distinction between legitimacy and political support is somewhat blurred because it’s not
clear to what extent the sources of political support should be interpreted as causes or as
defining characteristics of political support. Easton seems to opt for the latter
interpretation; however, it can be messy to define a phenomenon by its causes, which is
why many researchers have grounded their work in Easton but ultimately utilized a
framework more akin to that of Norris (2011) (Thomassen and van Ham 2017).
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Thus, echoing some of these common criticisms of Easton’s work, Ferrín et al
note that there is some confusion between how political support is defined and explained
and therefore propose two alternative concepts that are easier to identify empirically:
views and evaluations of democracy. They begin this analysis by exploring how
Europeans understand and define democracy in the abstract, dividing it into electoral,
liberal, and social justice elements. In measuring the “democratic awareness” of citizens,
they ultimately find that Europeans as a whole have a “very broad and far-reaching
understanding of democracy,” with little variation across countries (Ferrín et al 2016, 63).
Basically, they determine that, overall, Europeans strongly understand the concept of
democracy and are easily able to recognize which elements are most important (in this
case, free and fair elections, and rule of law).
However, even while citizens in Europe understand and support democracy, when
they go about evaluating their own, they have in mind a broad range of democratic
elements and values that their own institutions and system often fail to live up to (Ferrín
et al 2016, 164). Particularly when it comes to elements they regard as the most essential
for democracy, such as rule of law and government accountability, Europeans are
incredibly critical of their own regimes and often find them lacking. Evaluations are
made on a 10-point scale, so the authors consider anything above 5 to be “passing” while
anything below it “fails,” and the overall mean for all the elements is only 5.6. While this
does vary quite a bit by country, with a low of 3.8 in Ukraine and a high of 7.4 in
Sweden, it still strongly indicates that there is a growing gap between the ideal and the
perceived performance of democracies in Europe.
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Using the same dataset, but further confirming with data from the Eurobarometer
and European Commission, Weßels (2015), in addressing claims of a “rollback” of
European democracy, essentially reaches the same conclusion. He finds that, while
performance related measures of democratic practice reveal significant negative
developments, the normative foundations of democracy remain largely unaffected and
thus, he concludes there is no current threat of democratic decline. However, while Ferrín
et al end more optimistically with the note that this democratic deficit has not extended to
all elements of democracy and, crucially, doesn’t really affect the electoral elements,
Weßels warns that this may not always be the case. He cautions that continued negative
performance ratings may eventually “spillover” as dissatisfaction continues, beginning to
erode the support for the fundamental values and norms that are the building blocks of
democracy. If people continue to view the performance of their democracy negatively,
this will begin to affect the norms themselves, which echoes Inglehart’s (2003)
conclusion that just because a regime seems to have public support doesn’t guarantee
long-term survival. Thus, democratic legitimacy isn’t necessarily safe just because at the
moment dissatisfaction remains concentrated on performance, and we should be a little
more warry of this gap between norms and practice than others have concluded. If this
gap is indeed growing, it could indicate that this spillover has begun as the abstract and
the reality of democracy no longer meet, which has serious consequences for democratic
regime survival.
This deficit and its affects are further analyzed in Shin and Kim’s (2018) global
analysis that finds, overwhelmingly, citizens are able to define democracy, point out its
principles, and recognize it as a “preferred form of government,” yet at the same time are
20

often unable to correctly identify their own system as being autocratic or democratic
(244). Importantly, they find that, although most citizens define democracy in terms of
freedom and liberty, “they do not find these aspects to be highly salient components of
democracy,” and prioritize other elements when evaluating their own regime successes
and failures (Shin and Kim 2018, 237). The 6th Wave of the World Value Survey (20102014) for instance shows that citizens in Europe rank civil liberties behind many other
regime characteristics, such as free elections and gender equality. This is similar to Ferrín
et al.’s findings that elections and rule of law are top elements in the abstract ideal of
democracy. Close analysis of both the Arab and Asian Barometers revealed similar
findings- across the regions, when respondents were asked to select the most important
feature of democracy, they consistently prioritized elections (at 33% in East Asian
countries, 29% in MENA states) and economic security (at 32% and 28%), with political
freedom falling last in East Asia (14%) and freedom of speech last in Arab states (20%)
(Shin and Kim 2018, 238). This indicates that many citizens, particularly in non-western
countries, view democracy as a form of government that works “for the people” rather
than “by the people” (238).
While Shin and Kim’s work serves more as a comprehensive literature review
than as an empirical analysis, some disturbing points can be drawn from their research.
Critically, if citizens don’t actually recognize civil liberties to be as important as other
characteristics, it’s easier to see how they would perhaps be more accepting of those
rights being restricted. Shin and Kim, like many others before them, recognize a
disconnect between ideals and practice and find strong empirical evidence to support its
existence, but they are more akin to Weßels (2015) or Inglehart (2003) in indicating the
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situation may be more dire than some of their contemporaries note. It doesn’t really
matter if citizens can define democracy if they aren’t able to truly recognize it in practice,
particularly when they are ultimately basing their evaluations on elections and economic
considerations about all else, with seemingly little care for fundamental democratic
norms such as freedom of speech.
As long as citizens remain overly critical about their own regimes (and often
overly critical of arguably the wrong aspects of these regimes), it seems Weßels may be
right to worry of a spillover onto norms. The gap between norms and practice of
democracy is seemingly worsening every year, and it’s quite possible that we have
reached this tipping point where performance is no longer the only thing viewed
negatively. We have long ignored or overlooked the importance of public opinion in
gauging democratic strength, and even the existing studies that do either don’t seem to
afford it as much power as they should, or they focus on a specific, somewhat limited
timeframe. As many of the above studies have made clear however, we must pay more
attention to shifts and changes in public support, for if negative opinions have indeed
started to spillover onto support for norms, the situation is much more dire. This project
does not seek to reject any of these previous findings of a democratic paradox that isn’t a
real cause for alarm but instead a normal fluctuation of a democratic regime. Rather, it
seeks to expand on them and consider what could have changed to make it so
performance evaluations aren’t the only thing losing support. How has the world shifted
in ways that may have resulted in Weßels’ spillover occurring? With globalization and
rapid change a near constant, even these studies from 2015/6 are potentially outdated and
it is thus worth re-exploring the dangers this deficit holds and how norms may already be
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eroding. Of course, this question is far too large to fully explore in this project, instead I
will analyze one possible explanation that may shed light on why (or if) this spillover has
occurred: government prioritization of security over civil liberties.
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CHAPTER III
Research Design
For this project I will be analyzing democratic decline by specifically examining
how a government prioritization of security over civil liberties affects citizen support for
democratic norms. Therefore, my independent variable will be government policy
prioritizations, my dependent will be citizen support for norms and values, and my
hypothesis will be as follows:
State prioritization of security policy over civil liberties causes citizen support for
fundamental democratic norms to decline.
The main data in this analysis will be public opinion and I will utilize case studies
and some simple time series analysis of public survey data collected over the past 20
years to examine this hypothesis. Specifically, I focus on states that have balanced this
prioritization at different levels, either with security a higher priority, with freedom a
higher priority, or an attempt to keep the two values somewhat equal. My design includes
three cases: New Zealand, The United States, and Turkey. This will allow the project to
take the form of a comparative case study as I examine the ways these three very
different states have approached the same problem of terrorism. There are clearly many
important differences between these cases, as will be expanded on below, which is why
this research takes a method of agreement approach, recognizing that the states differ in
most regards, but not in the fact they face a security threat from terrorism or that the
health of their democracy has changed in the past 20 years, either for better or for worse.
This is primarily a qualitative analysis because its main focus is case studies and
descriptive narrative, however I also include a little bit of quantitative work through some
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simple regression and time series analysis in order to test relationships between my
variables and provide further strength to my argument. By including a time series
analysis I will be able to better understand the role timing has in the security vs. freedom
debate, for there has been considerable work done in the past to support the idea of a
“rally around the flag” affect occurring immediately after national crises, such as terrorist
attacks. The question is if this attitude persists as distance grows from the time of attack,
or if perceptions of threat and general government confidence return to pre-attack levels.
This is deductive research because I am building off of ideas and theories of
previous authors, in particular those such as Thomassen and van Ham and Norris who
argue that democratic legitimacy is safe and claims of decline are exaggerated. In effect
this means that I am testing an existing theory by claiming that variables or factors have
changed that has altered or negated the arguments of these researchers. For instance,
Weßels and Inglehart both argue that democratic legitimacy is not in danger because
people still support norms, and thus it’s ultimately just performance ratings that have
decreased. Contrary to this, I am using more recent evidence to make an argument that
people don’t necessarily support these foundational norms anymore (but at one point they
did) by examining the security environment as a potential cause. Thus, I am expanding
improving upon these earlier theories of democracy, rather than attempting to disprove or
negate them.
The conceptual foundation of this analysis is therefore based in democratic theory
and, since the focus is on changes in public opinion, the data takes on an almost
constructivist/interpretivist paradigm. In analyzing how government policy transitions
affect citizen’s views on democratic norms, I am essentially exploring how this reality or
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understanding of the world is created by individuals. With complex concepts such as
“democracy” and “legitimacy” it all comes down to how they are defined and understood,
and thus they have different meanings for different people at different times. For this
analysis I’m exploring one possible method by which that understood meaning changes
and the effects this change might have on the broader idea of democratic survival.

Data:
As previously mentioned, my data will primarily be found in public opinion
surveys, and thus my main sources will be existing public databases, in particular the
World Values Survey, European Social Survey, and various regional Democracy
Barometers. As I am examining public opinion, the level of analysis will predominantly
be individual or micro level, although my units of comparison are going to be the states
in my case study. Even though my comparison is about states, the data I’m concerned
with is public support for democracy, and thus the analysis will remain on the individual
level.
While these public databases are a fantastic resource, there are numerous
measurement pitfalls inherent in these sorts of analyses that must be noted. Particularly
when looking at a variable such as public opinion, there are often gaps across time and
space, making it tricky to work with multiple data sets at once. For instance, for
confirmation of his analysis on public support for democratic norms, Bernhard Weßels
(2015) used the ESS wave 6 dataset which measures normative elements of liberal
democracy. While this is a great collection of data, there is the glaringly obvious issue
that Greece, one of the key states in his analysis, was missing from the survey in both
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2006 and 2012, and 2012 was the only year the survey very specifically asked about the
“meaning of democracy” (Weßels 2015, 99). This meant that, although he still produced
interesting findings Weßels’ conclusions were greatly weakened by the limited
availability of the data he needed and the fact that a key state was missing from the public
dataset.
There will always be issues like this in using public opinion survey datasets, and
while this doesn’t make them less useful or their results less valid, it is a potential
problem that is worth recognizing so as to combat it and keep it from weakening the
overall strength of the research. For this reason most researchers of public opinion will
focus only on items collected by one survey project at one specific point in time, thereby
creating a relatively smaller cross-national dataset. There are some, such as Christopher
Claassen (2020), who have recently created dynamic Bayesian latent trait models which
permit for a smoother combination and measurement of all available data, however due to
time and resource constraints, I will not be utilizing these, and instead will rely on a
smaller dataset but be very cautious of the compatibility of various data.
Furthermore, many of these public datasets have received various criticism over
the years, especially those used to measure democracy. Complex concepts such as
“democracy” require complex measurement and there is no set or agreed upon way to do
so, resulting in over 10 different datasets in existence. Of these the three most widely
used are the democracy-autocracy index from Polity IV, the Freedom House Index, and
the Przeworski et al dichotomous democracy-dictatorship indicators. However, both
Polity and the dichotomous indicators have been criticized for neglecting to account for
the extent to which participation in the political process is a widespread and important
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feature of democracy, and the dichotomous indicators have been found to lead to lower
validity. Both Polity and Freedom House have been found to have fairly high levels of
measurement error in some instances and to cluster at extreme values which raises
concern that they are not fine-grained enough to pick up variation in highly democratic or
highly autocratic countries. Finally, criticism has also been directed at the lack of clarity
by which scores are assigned to indicators and the two datasets use of generalists rather
than country specialists to assign these scores (Claassen 2020). Again however, despite
these criticisms, these datasets remain the most frequently used and trusted, and thus I
will also be using them, but must remain vigilant and careful in understanding their
specific measurements and indicators so as to keep my analysis valid.

Measurements:
There are several possible ways to measure the level or strength of democracy,
but one of the most straightforward involves analyzing the legitimacy of the regime. A
legitimate regime is one in which political authority rests on the consent of the governed,
meaning that the citizens think the political authority has the right to rule, and, unlike in
nondemocratic regimes, a democracy will fail if the people don’t see this authority as
legitimate. The best approach to measuring legitimacy is thus to measure the level of
political support for the regime and its principles. Drawing on formative works by Easton
(1965, 1975), Dalton (1999), and Norris (1999), political support is most often measured
through a series of “levels” or categories. Easton (1965, 1975) originally identified three
levels of political support: the community, the regime, and the authorities. Due to the
some of the inherent difficulties in conceptualizing “regime,” this level was further
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specified by Dalton (1999) and Norris (1999) into regime principles, regime
performance, and regime institutions (Thomassen and van Ham 2017, 19). This
ultimately provides us with a five-fold classification of political support which I will be
utilizing to explore public opinion survey data in regard to government prioritization of
security policy (See Table 1 below).
There are a number of ways to measure each of these levels of support, but to
keep my analysis consistent with previous works of a similar nature, I will be using some
of the more common indicators for each level, as laid out by Thomassen and van Ham
(2017). Support for the political community is therefore measured as national pride.
Support for regime principals is measured as support for democratic political regimes
versus alternative types (i.e., citizen evaluations of democracy as a regime).
Measuring Political Support
Level

Indicator

WVS Measurement

WVS Scoring

Political
Community

Affective attachment
to political
community
Evaluation of
democracy as a
political system
Evaluation of
performance of own
democratic system
confidence/trust in
institutions

National Pride

"Very Proud," "Quite
Proud," "Not Very Proud,"
"Not at all Proud"
1 ("not at all important") 10 ("absolutely
important")
1 ("not at all democratic") 10 ("completely
democratic")
"A Great Deal," "Quite a
Lot," "Not Very Much,"
"None at All"

Political
Regime:
Principles
Political
Regime:
Performance
Political
Regime:
Institutions
Political
Authorities

confidence/trust in
political actors and
authorities

Importance of
Democracy
Democraticness in
Own Country
Confidence in
Parliament;
Confidence in Political
Parties
Confidence in
Government

"A Great Deal," "Quite a
Lot," "Not Very Much,"
"None at All"

Table 1- Framework for Measuring Political Support
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Regime performance is measured as satisfaction with the functioning of democracy and
support for regime institutions is measured by trust or confidence in a range of
institutions, most often parliament and political parties. Finally, support for political
authorities is measured by trust in the incumbent political leaders and evaluations of their
performance (Thomassen and van Ham 19, 2017).
To measure this public opinion and support I will primarily be using the World
Values Survey due to its accessibility and the wide range of questions it asks respondents.
In particular, the WVS has questions on national pride, citizen support for democratic
ideals, citizen evaluation of their own regime, trust in institutions, and confidence in
government, parliament, and parties, allowing me to address all 5 aspects of measuring
political support, per Thomassen and van Ham. Most of these questions have also been
asked over a number of different waves of the WVS, allowing for a better understanding
of how they have changed over time. Beyond these core indicators, the WVS also has
more specific questions focusing on important components of democracy, such as civil
rights, free and fair elections, and gender equality, all of which will be utilized to form a
more complete picture of the state of democracy in each of my test cases. Importantly as
well, the range of questions asked also provide for a differentiation between how citizens
view democracy in the abstract or ideal, and how they view its performance in practice
within their country, which is a key distinction that must be recognized, as explained by
Weßels (2015), Ferrín and Kriesi (2016), and many others.
Most of the existing survey datasets I will use organize responses ordinally and
thus the data I examine will mostly fall into this category. For instance, The World
Values Survey asks respondents how important democracy is to them, with 1 being “not
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at all important” and 10 being “absolutely important” with each number in between
indicating it is a fraction more important than the previous one. This allows them to take
the somewhat vague concept of democratic importance and build concrete categories out
of levels of support, providing an easy and observable measurement. The majority of
WVS questions are answered on a 10-point scale such as this and for simplicity’s sake, as
well as graphing purposes, in the analysis below I have condensed the responses into 3
categories: those responding 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10.
I will primarily be using Freedom House and The Economists Intelligent Unit’s
Democracy Index to measure the current standing of democracy in each country because,
despite the criticisms these sources may have received, they remain very valuable tools
for exploring the overall levels of democracy in a state, particularly in terms of restricting
civil liberties. Although we lack a general consensus on the precise definition of
democracy, most scholars would agree that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of
democracy include government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed,
the existence of free and fair elections, a level of government accountability, and respect
for basic human rights. No two democracies are exactly the same, and the “best” balance
of these various ideals is relatively context dependent, based on a wide range of statespecific factors, such as historical, social, and cultural considerations (Clucas and Valdini
2014). Freedom House accounts for these possible variations by awarding a country 0 to
4 points for each of 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties indicators, giving each state
an overall score of 0-100, with 0 meaning “not free,” 34 to 71 meaning “partly free,” and
100 meaning “free.” Political rights questions are grouped into the subcategories of
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of
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government, while indicators of “civil liberties” include freedom of expression and
belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and
individual rights. Each indicator includes a number of sub-measures looking at specific
institutions and rights, such as freedom of assembly, an independent judiciary, and
academic freedom, all of which together create a very comprehensive measurement of
civil liberties and overall measure of democratic strength (Freedom House 2020).
The Democracy Index meanwhile is a report put together every year by the
Economist Intelligence Unit based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, the
functioning of government, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties.
Based on its scores on a range of indicators within these categories, each country is then
itself classified as one of four types of regime: “full democracy”, “flawed democracy”,
“hybrid regime” or “authoritarian regime,” giving a little more breakdown and
categorization than Freedom House. The EIU also uses a slightly more complex scoring
system, combining a dichotomous and a three-point system for 60 indicators, resulting in
a score of 1-10 for each category which is then averaged to produce the states’ overall
Index score (EIU 2020). Examining the scores given by both the EIU and Freedom
House will allow a more in-depth understanding of the strength of democracy in each
state, especially in regard to civil liberties.
Other measurements that will be used analyze the threat the state faces from
terrorism and various data on the history of terror and government responses to it, most of
which is available in the Global Terrorism Index annual reports which are published by
the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) using the Global Terrorism Dataset.
Measuring terrorism is inherently tricky, for each country has slight differences in how
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they define and understand a terrorist act, introducing the possibility of error in
recognizing attacks. To limit this, I will understand terrorism as defined by the Global
Terrorism Index, for their scores are the driving force of this analysis. They very simply
define terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion,
or intimidation” (GTI 2020, 6). Importantly, this definition recognizes that terrorism is
not only a physical act, but also the psychological impact it has on a society for many
years afterwards, which is crucial for my analysis. They take their definition even further
and state that, for an act to be included in their global ranking, it must meet three criteria:
1.) The incident must be intentional, 2.) It must entail some level of violence or threat of
violence, including property damage, and 3.) The perpetrators must by sub-national
actors (meaning this database does not include acts of state terrorism). There are also
useful terrorism and security related data available on the US Department of State’s
Country Reports on Terrorism and in the CIA Factbook, but in using these I must be very
aware of the inherent bias in using US government funded sources. Finally, I will also
utilize various polls, such as Gallup and Pew, as well as country specific surveys, such as
MetroPoll in Turkey, to form a fuller picture of a populations’ general attitude towards
terrorism and the government’s response to these types of threats.
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CHAPTER IV
Case Studies
IntroductionBefore exploring the WVS data and how it works towards my argument, it’s
necessary to give a summary of each of my three cases and how they have approached
the questions of security and freedom. By first building a foundation of each states’ past
relationship with both democracy and terrorism, the later analysis will have stronger
ground to stand on and provide the reader with a better understanding of why the
governments choice of prioritization had the effect it did. This comparative case study
focuses on three states with very different regimes in terms of democratic strength in
order to test my hypothesis. New Zealand, The United States, and Turkey were all chosen
primarily for the simple reason that they all face a relatively high threat from terrorism (at
least in comparison to most other democracies and hybrid regimes) and thus have all had
to address this question of security vs. civil liberties in a very serious way. As is revealed
below, they also serve as a clear example of best, middle, and worst-case scenario of
what happens to democracy when civil liberties are no longer prioritized. New Zealand,
despite an increased risk of terrorism, never put security over freedom, and remains one
of the freest and most democratic countries in the world. Turkey meanwhile heavily
prioritized security and restricted most civil liberties, especially for the Kurds and any
others in society considered a threat by the government, and now they have lost nearly all
semblance of democracy, drifting closer and closer to a full autocracy by the year. The
United States falls between the two, initially implementing harsh rights-restricting
security policy but rolling it back somewhat when met with protest; however still
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prioritizing security at the expense of rights, while creeping into hybridity and steadily
away from the stable democracy it once was.
These three states were chosen in part because of just how different they are in
most respects. In population, size, even in length of democratic experience, they differ,
which allows me to focus specifically on where the similarities lie- the higher security
threat the state faces. New Zealand has a population just under 5 million and is an island
nation, meaning they already have a great deal of natural protection and a relatively small
citizenry to keep safe. Turkey has a much larger population of 83.6 million, holds a
crucial geopolitical position as the gateway between East and West, and is surrounded by
states in conflict, from border disputes in the Caucuses, to brutal civil wars in Syria and
Yemen, to political turmoil in Israel and Iraq, and thus faces high risk from all sides.
Finally, the US has the largest population at 328.2 million and holds some natural
protection by being bounded by oceans on two sides, however, is also a key political and
economic player in global affairs, thereby making them a more high-profile target
(Worldometer, “Countries by Population 2021”).
While these differences are important and help explain why each country reacted
exactly as they did, they don’t change the basic fact that all three states faced this same
decision between freedom and security and responded to it in varying degrees, resulting
in citizen support for democratic norms changing in keyways. Thus, why it’s perhaps
understandable that Turkey responded to terrorism with harsher policies, given their
precarious environment, it doesn’t justify the fact that democracy suffered as a result. The
way these government prioritizations affected public opinion and changed citizen support
for fundamental norms by making them seem unnecessary or even risky to have is what’s
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crucial to focus on here. In examining the broader picture of why democratic decline
persists many variables are clearly at play, and these case studies reveal that changing
public opinion towards democracy may be one of them by comparing three different
states that approached the security vs. freedom debate differently and whose democracies
have strengthened or declined as a result. This section will go over a brief summary of
each case in terms of the history of their democracy, the threat they face from terrorism,
and how exactly the government has responded, in order to draw a connection between
this prioritization and how support for fundamental norms may have shifted.

New ZealandNew Zealand presents an interesting case study, due to their isolation, relative
“newness,” and consistently high score across freedom and democracy indexes. The state
remains part of the Commonwealth, only officially having gained their independence
from England in 1947 with the Statute of Westminster, and in many aspects their political
system reflects this British heritage. New Zealand’s constitution is not codified, meaning
it’s a mixture of statute and convention, giving it a great deal of adaptability but also
giving rise to occasional controversies over different understandings and meanings.
Despite their isolation, New Zealand is an active member of a number of IGOs and
remains heavily engaged in international affairs, often serving as a role model to other
western democracies (for instance, in their current handling of the Covid-19 pandemic)
(Oliver 2021).
New Zealand has a strong record of free and fair elections and safeguarding
political and civil rights, resulting in the state consistently ranking at the top of a wide
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range of global freedom indexes. Freedom House gives them a rating of 99 out of 100,
noting particularly their electoral rights and strong anticorruption record as well as the
independent media. The only reason New Zealand isn’t given a perfect score is due to the
economic inequality still felt by members of the Maori population and some instances of
discrimination felt in education and the workplace (Freedom House 2020). These high
scores are confirmed further by the Economist Democracy Index, who rank New Zealand
as 4th in the world in terms of democratic strength, due especially to their protection of
civil liberties and democratic electoral process. The EIU also discusses the high
functionality of their current government under Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and the
ever-increasing political participation across all sectors of society as important factors in
the state’s persistent high score (EIU 2020). The only states that outrank New Zealand on
most democratic index are the Nordic countries, who boast incredibly high political
culture and participation, however in terms of civil liberties New Zealand ranks supreme.
The World Liberty Index places them first out of 187, as does the Human Freedom Index,
and Transparency International ranks them as the least corrupt country in the world. All
this is to say that, comparatively, New Zealand is a very free state with strong protections
of civil liberties, and thus serves as an important case study in the security vs. freedom
debate.
Jacinda Ardern, leader of the social-democratic Labour Party, has served as New
Zealand’s Prime Minster since 2017 and has improved the state’s already high democracy
and freedom scores in nearly all categories. Upon her election she became the world’s
youngest female head of government at age 37 and since then has dealt with a number of
crises and disasters with a skill and poise that has garnered her international praise as
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well as incredibly high support domestically. Just in the past few years, her handling of
the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2019 Christchurch massacre, and the 2019 White Island
volcanic eruption brought her worldwide endorsement and allowed her party to gain an
outright majority of seats in Parliament in 2020, the first time this has happened since the
country introduced proportional representation in the 90s (Vowels and Dalziel 2021). She
has focused her government particularly on the New Zealand housing crisis, child
poverty, and social inequality, emerging as a strong defender of civil liberties not only at
home but also across the globe. It should be clear from even this brief summary that New
Zealand’s government is a very democratic one and one that continues to prioritize
freedoms over most other concerns, with the strong support of the citizens (Ardern’s
current approval rating is 60%, while the Labour Party’s is 56% (BBC 2020)). It is, of
course, worth noting that one of New Zealand’s defining features is its relative isolation,
perhaps giving the citizens an inherently greater sense of security than those residing
somewhere like Turkey, where they are closely surrounded by numerous regional
conflicts. This isolation has allowed the government to maintain its prioritization of
freedoms over security regardless of international events, giving them a distinct
advantage that they have clearly used to their benefit, and to the benefit of their citizens
who enjoy greater civil liberties than their counterparts in most other states.
It follows then that, for most of their history, the primary conflict in New Zealand
has been between the indigenous Maori population and the colonizers and their
descendants, making terrorism never much of a threat or concern to the government. In
fact, the 20th century was almost entirely free of terrorism in New Zealand, other than a
few smaller bombings and attempted bombings related to acts of anti-war protest and the
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sinking of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985. The Rainbow Warrior incident is a somewhat
unusual case, as it involved the French foreign service bombing a Greenpeace vessel in a
New Zealand harbor that was on its way to protest French nuclear testing in the Southern
Pacific, and thus while it is clearly an act of state-sponsored terror, it differs greatly from
the sort of jihadist and insurgency type terrorism Turkey was facing at the same time. In
response to the Rainbow Warrior bombings the government passed the International
Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act in 1987, which essentially just conferred emergency
powers on the police and armed forces in the event of a declaration of an “international
terrorist emergency,” but didn’t change much else in terms of the government response
(Small 2011). The perceived low threat throughout the 20th century meant that terrorism
ultimately “remained in the background rather than the forefront of national security
priorities” and by the turn of the century New Zealand still had essentially no
antiterrorism legislation on the books (Battersby 2018, 65).
Along with most of the western world, following the 9/11 attacks New Zealand
finally implemented antiterrorism policy with the enactment of the Terrorism
Suppression Act 2002. This act, like most others in this era, somewhat broadened the
powers of the executive and “strengthened ties with like-minded states” in the fight
against global terrorism, but the primary purpose of the legislation was to create a better
definition and understanding of terrorism itself (Battersby 2018). It created more serious
offenses for financing terrorism, joining or recruiting members for terrorist groups, and
harboring terrorists, however until 2019 the act was never formally used. Following a
lengthy surveillance operation in 2007 a small group of activists were arrested and,
although law enforcement attempted to use this legislation as justification, ultimately no
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charges were laid under the Terrorism Suppression Act and the Attorney General went as
far as to call it “unnecessarily complex” and “incoherent,” leading to its slight
amendment later that year (Battersby 2018, 67). Ultimately, police in New Zealand have
chosen to rely on regular criminal legislation for offenses that could be claimed as
terrorist in nature, and it’s notable that this Act didn’t add any new agencies or divisions
to the security force, and only expanded the budget of the intelligence agency, but no
other branch (Battersby 2018). Even as much of the world was hastily implementing new
policy and empowering authorities to detain and arrest indiscriminately, New Zealand
continued to prioritize freedoms, and considered the general threat level to remain low.
The New Zealand government, even while addressing societal fears and concerns,
has consistently made sure to safeguard civil liberties as the highest priority, rather than
allow fear to dictate restrictions. Compared to countries across the world in the wake of
9/11, New Zealand adopted an anti-terrorism regime that “effectively balances
international demands, national needs, and individual rights,” earning them high
international praise (Smith 3, 2003). Not only did the Terrorism Suppression Act rely on
a much narrower definition of terrorism than the rest of the world, thereby all but
eliminating the possibility of protestors and others being unnecessarily brought in by its
laws, but it also declared mere membership in a terrorist organization to not constitute a
crime. This provision, while granted, somewhat controversial, allowed individuals to
retain certain rights and freedoms and required more evidence than membership alone to
consider someone suspect. Further, in contrast to antiterrorism legislation such as the
Patriot Act, New Zealand’s law did not permit detention without charge and included
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provisions for judicial review, to ensure even those suspected of terrorist acts received
equal and fair treatment under the law (Small 2011).
Importantly, the desire for continued vigilance in protecting individual freedoms
is not a partisan issue, and instead exists as a shared priority across the political spectrum.
As Peter Dunne, the retired leader of the centrist United Future party, in addressing
political repression in other countries due to antiterrorism policy, proudly noted- “the
reality of this country has been that we have been blessed with governments and leaders
over the years who have not so indulged. It is not part of the New Zealand character to
become so involved to that degree in the repression of our own citizens” (Smith 57,
2003). Likewise, Phil Goff, the current mayor of Auckland and former leader of the
Labour Party congratulated Parliament on “finding the balance,” noting that the TSA
“protects the proper civil liberties of New Zealanders, and at the same time [allows] for
effective action to be taken against terrorism” (Smith 59, 2003). Many saw the key to this
bill’s perceived success at achieving this balance being Parliament’s acceptance of
submissions by any concerned civil or human rights organizations in the state, which
were then incorporated into the final draft, in effect making sure all voices were heard
(Small 2011). Thus, even while New Zealand implemented policy changes in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, they took a very measured and balanced response to the
declaration of an international “War on Terror,” taking care to always prioritize freedom
and only take action proportional to the threat faced.
This perceived level of threat and sense of security changed quite suddenly and
drastically in 2019 with the Christchurch Massacre. On March 15 Brenton Tarrant, an
Australian white supremacist, shot up a mosque and an Islamic center in Christchurch,
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killing 51 people and injuring 40. The attacker was motivated by far-right extremism and
Islamophobia and for his actions received the first life sentence without parole ever
handed down in New Zealand. He filmed the first half of his attack, streaming it live on
Facebook, and prior to the incident published a manifesto detailing his anti-Muslim and
anti-immigrant sentiments, both of which were quickly banned from possession or
distribution. The manifesto has since reappeared in connection to a number of other mass
shootings and terrorist attacks across the globe where perpetrators cited the document as
inspiration and the Christchurch shooter as a “hero” or “saint” (Coaston 2019, BBC
2019).2
As both the worst mass shooting and the deadliest terrorist attack in New
Zealand’s history, this massacre deeply shook society and led to renewed calls for
stronger gun and antiterrorism laws in the state. New Zealand is almost on par with the
United States in terms of unregistered firearms, however, unlike the US which remains
plagued by mass shootings with little restriction, within a month of the Christchurch
attack, the Arms Amendment Act 2019 was passed. This Act required all legally obtained
semiautomatic and military-grade firearms and their ammunition to be handed over to
police in a buy-back scheme that has since been called both a success (over 50,000
firearms were collected) and a failure (there are most likely well over 100,000

2

Interestingly, and very troublingly, footage of the event also showed up in Turkey as part of Erdoğan’s
campaign rallies in 2019, as he condemned the attacker and the west in general for not sentencing him to
death for his viciously anti-Muslim actions. President Erdoğan likes to portray himself as a leader of the
Muslim world and, because part of the manifesto directly called out Turks, he seized this opportunity to
create an enemy (something he thrives on) and to depict Turkey “as under threat and himself as its savior”
(BBC 2019). Erdoğan’s actions in response to domestic terrorist attacks will be reviewed in more depth
below, but it is incredibly noteworthy that he also uses international attacks as part of his effort to
consolidate power and play off the fear of terrorism deeply engrained in Turkish society.
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unregistered firearms still at large) (Zraick 2019). The government also was quick to
increase Human Rights Commission funding and propose updates to hate speech
legislation, with Jacinda Ardern noting that “hate-fueled behavior” is “unacceptable, and
totally against who we are, and what we aspire to be as a nation” (TVNZ 2020).
It’s notable that even in the wake of such an unprecedented and brutal terrorist
attack, New Zealand did not really pursue any new terrorism legislation. Rather than
target the idea of terrorism and extremism, they very specifically targeted the weapons
used in the attack, and the only restrictions on civil liberties implemented after the
incident were those related to sharing or possessing the video or manifesto created by the
attacker. While restrictions on hate speech were increased, the government made a
conscious choice to not introduce harsher restrictions on any civil rights, including
freedom of movement and association, preferring to keep the same terrorism policies in
place despite the increase in threat level. Further, Ardern’s government worked tirelessly
to keep the rhetoric around the event from ever turning into an “us vs. them” debate,
which, as Davis and Silver explained, served to increase fear and distrust in the United
States. Instead, Ardern kept the conversation in New Zealand focused on tangible fixes,
such as gun control, and on bringing the country together. In this way the government
very clearly continued to prioritize freedoms over security, allowing New Zealand to
maintain its top ranking across democracy indexes, even as it rose drastically up the
Global Terrorism Index. Due to Christchurch and some smaller attempted attacks in the
past five years, New Zealand ranks as number 42 on the GTI 2020, with a score of 4.37
out of 10 (GTI 2020). The country still rates its threat level as “medium,” down from
“high” immediately after the attack, yet it hasn’t taken some of the more extreme policy
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actions that other nations have in response to terrorist attacks. In lamenting the western
world’s response to terrorism Australian author Christian Michaelsen noted that “a policy
that does not respect human rights in the first place cannot legitimately claim to protect
these rights against transnational security threats in times of emergency,” and it seems
New Zealand’s government recognizes this balance more than most (Small 74, 2011).

United StatesThe United States stands out when it comes to the security vs. freedom debate,
due primarily to the seeming paradox it reveals to be present in society. A large majority
of US citizens proclaim freedom to be the most important priority of the country, and yet,
in the past two decades the government has passed a series of restrictive policies that
overwhelmingly were accepted by the public, even as they were directly opposed to these
same freedoms thought to be so crucial. This apparent contradiction, while visible in
many states, seems perhaps the most extreme in the US, which is what makes it such a
fascinating case study. The United States is highly developed, is the world’s foremost
military power and largest economy by GDP and is still considered by many to be the
“leader of the free world,” however there have been some troubling changes in the past
decade or so (Harris 2021). Most notably, across many democracy and freedom indexes,
the United States, a country that so long stood as the prime example and goal for
developing states, no longer qualifies as a full democracy.
Since 2016 The Economist Democracy Index has ranked the United States as a
“flawed democracy,” due to ever-increasing erosion of public trust in institutions, a
phenomenon that began well before the election of Donald Trump but was significantly
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accelerated under his administration (EIU 2020). Due to some positive developments in
political engagement and political participation, the US maintained it’s ranking of 25th on
the global scale, even while there were worrying decreases in a number of other
categories. Further, the EIU warns that “the country exhibits a number of democratic
deficits that could result in a further deterioration in its score and ranking in the near
future,” looking with particular worry at increasing threats to freedom of expression and
the extreme polarization that exists within American society (EIU 2020, 43). For
instance, a November 2020 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center found that voters
saw the differences between the two candidates in the 2020 election as being about
“fundamental, core American values,” rather than politics and policies, indicating that
Americans occupy two distinct and conflicting realities and casting doubt on any shortterm improvement in the strength of our democracy (Dimock and Wike 2020). It’s also
important to recognize that, while Trump’s presidency certainly added fuel to the fire and
intensified many tensions within society, these weaknesses in American democracy have
been increasing steadily well before he took office and are part of a larger problem then
just one administration.
Freedom House too has noted a steady decrease in score over the past decade,
although they still rate the United States as a “free” country, albeit a very low “free” with
a score of 83 out of 100. In the past five years Freedom House recorded a slow decline,
from 89, to 87, to 86, and now to 83, and by their measurement the cut off between “free”
and “partly free” lies at 72, a range we are creeping closely to by the year (Freedom
House 2020). While most of the recognized decrease in score has been in the category of
political rights, found especially in the erosion of democratic institutions, civil liberties
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have also been affected and internet freedom in particular is ranked at a 76 out of 100 and
continues to decrease. As reflected in the literature review, countless factors have been
pointed to as possible causes for this phenomenon of democratic decrease, and while
there is certainly truth to be found in some of these explanations, many of them again
focus especially on the political and wealthy elites in society, rather that the citizens
themselves. If the citizens are willingly (or apathetically) turning away from foundational
democratic norms, what could account for this? Again, it must be reiterated that this is a
multifaceted issue, and no one answer will have all the solutions, rather they may all
work together as pieces of the puzzle. And when it comes to US citizen support for
democracy, a fascinating place to start is the security-freedom debate, and the intense fear
of terrorism that exists among the American public.
The United States is the highest-ranking western democracy in terms of a threat
from terrorism, coming in at number 29 on the GTI 2020 Index with a score of 5.26 out
of 10. This places it significantly higher on the list than most European democracies, with
the exception of the UK (who follows immediately behind at number 30), and France
(38th), and above most global democracies in general, with the exception of the flawed
democracies of India (which ranks 8th) and the Philippines (10th). The US is threatened
by both domestic and international terrorism, and since the attacks of September 2001
this fear has been predominately directed at “al Qaeda inspired terrorism,” even though in
recent years the vast majority of attacks and attempted attacks were linked to right-wing
extremist groups rather than Islamic terrorism (GTI 2020). In fact, according to the US
Government Accountability Office, since September 2001, right-wing extremist have
been responsible for 73% of terrorist incidents in the US, while radical Islamist
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extremists were responsible for around 25% (GAO-17-300, Countering Violent
Extremism 2017). As of 2020, right-wing extremist terrorism has killed more people in
the continental US since 9/11 than Islamic terrorism, but this hasn’t stopped the persistent
anti-Islam and anti-immigration sentiment in the country.
Of course, when one considers both the devastation and the unprecedented nature
of the 9/11 attacks, it’s not all that surprising that this fear of Islamic terror has remained
so persistent, even 20 years later. The hijacking of four domestic airliners by members of
the al-Qaeda network resulted in the death of 2,507 civilians, 343 firefighters, 72 law
enforcement officers, 55 military personnel and 19 perpetrators, and had permanent
psychological and political affects that have fundamentally altered American society in
countless ways (Bergen 2003). Responses were instantaneous following the attack, which
still holds the infamy of being the deadliest attack in human history, and ranged from an
immediate rise in Muslim targeted hate crimes to a government crackdown on
fundamental freedoms. Within a week President George Bush’s approval rating soared to
90%, the highest of any American president, despite (or perhaps due in part to) the
instigation of the US War on Terror and a massive restructuring of the US government,
creating of the Department of Homeland Security and the strengthening of the NSA
(Dempsey and Cole 2006). Most importantly for the context of this paper, within a month
of the attacks, and with essentially no time for debate, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act.
The Patriot Act was enacted under extraordinary pressure from John Ashcroft, the
Attorney General at the time, and within an environment of such intense fear that even
supporters of the bill did not read it as they were in such a rush to pass counterterrorism
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policy. President Bush signed the Act on October 26, with widespread approval from the
public and very little political debate. Very basically, the three main provisions of the act
are: an expanded ability of law enforcement for surveillance of the public, eased
interagency communication, and increased penalties for terrorism crimes and an
expanded list of what qualifies as “terrorism” (Cole and Dempsey 2006). Some measures
of the Patriot Act made perfect sense and were necessary to provide needed security,
particularly interagency communication, however in many respects the Act reflected an
extreme overreaction that “violated core constitutional principles” (197). Ultimately the
Patriot Act significantly expanded the power of the authorities and “cast a cloak of
secrecy over the exercise of government power” through its removal of limitations and
judicial controls (197). Some of the more controversial provisions were those that
imposed guilt by association on immigrants, authorized detention of anyone based on
mere suspicion, expanded the government’s ability to collect information on citizens in
secret, reduced judicial oversight, and gave the Treasury Department authority to freeze
property and assets with very little actual evidence (Cole and Dempsey 2006). As we
now know, this act, along with other actions and policies taken as part of the so-called
War on Terror, have led to ethnic profiling, data mining, and the unjust detention and
torture of hundreds of people, as evidenced through the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, just
to name one particularly heinous incident.
While human rights advocates were immediately opposed or cautiously against
some of the provisions in the act, the American public were overwhelmingly supportive,
even though it placed restrictions on some of their rights (Davis and Silver 2004). It
seems that, when it comes to civil liberties and freedoms, Americans are more supportive
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of them in the abstract than in practice, and thus will say they favor freedom above all
else, even while accepting restrictions imposed by the Patriot Act. Studies in the past
have found that, overwhelmingly, when they feel threatened, “people who previously
protected civil liberties and personal freedom may compromise on these values for
greater security,” as abstract ideals crumble when faced with harsh realities (Davis and
Silver 2004, 38). Following the horrors of the 9/11 attacks, it was hammered home how
truly devastating terrorist acts could be, and this realization instilled a deep seeded fear in
citizens across the country, allowing the government to enact freedom restricting policies
without much complaint. Interestingly, this general attitude has persisted, despite the
distance from these attacks, allowing the Patriot Act to be reauthorized a number of
times, by both conservative and democratic presidents (Laperruque 2020).3 As will be
discussed in more detail in the data analysis portion of this paper, there exists a
fascinating trend in American society where the fear of terrorism increases every year,
while the actual threat of terrorism has been decreasing, and poses essentially no risk
compared to other much more prevalent threats such as gun violence (another security vs.
civil liberties issue, but one where the “freedom” aspect always seems to win out).
This is not to discount the very real psychological damage the events of 9/11 had
on American society or imply that terrorism poses no risk at all to the general public,

3

The most recent of these was passed by the Senate on May 14, 2020 under the mantle of the USA
FREEDOM Reauthorization Act which reauthorized the Patriot Act (or more accurately, reauthorized the
1978 Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act which the Patriot Act itself was an amendment of) through
December 2023. While this Act ended the invasive call detail records program, it also extended a number
of the most controversial provisions of the original Patriot Act including roving wiretaps, the “lone wolf”
provision and Section 215 which gives the government immense power to demand records from
companies for national security investigations (H.R. 6172, 2020; Laperruque 2020; Cole and Dempsey
2004)
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simply that when it’s put into perspective, the prioritization that citizens have accepted is
somewhat confusing. Of course, attacks and attempted attacks have continued to occur
since 2001, with some of the most heinous being the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013,
the Pulse nightclub attack in 2016, and the El Paso shooting in 2019, although there have
been many more across the country and with all manner of motivations and targets (US
Dept. Homeland Security: Terrorism Timeline 2021). Despite the changing nature of
warfare and terrorism in general, the US has maintained relatively similar policies as the
ones first enacted in 2001. The Patriot Act has been amended and reauthorized a number
of times, with some particularly controversial provisions being removed, however
ultimately the US counterterrorism approach has remained the same- surveillance and a
lack of transparency, along with war and intervention in foreign countries to allegedly
make the world a safer place. The rise of the Islamic State in the mid-2010s further
encouraged this same sort of policy, with the United States eventually leading the
coalition to stop ISIL and taking a very active role in global counterterrorism policy.
With the rising threat of ISIL and high-profile attacks carried out across the globe
attributed to splinter cells, fear of terrorism increased yet again and heavy US
involvement abroad was considered acceptable and even “just.”
Unlike in New Zealand, the government in the United States has wholeheartedly
decided to embrace security at the cost of civil liberties and have received a clear green
light to do so by the American public (Davis and Silver 2004). This prioritization can
certainly be attributed in part to proportional differences in the size of the threat faced,
not to mention the size of the country’s themselves, and to their different roles in the
international community, however the fundamental effect of this decision can’t be
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overlooked. From its implementation the Patriot Act’s mere existence ran contrary to a
number of critical democratic rights, particularly freedom of speech, due process, and
privacy, and while these provisions have been scaled back some since 2001, they remain
disproportionate to the threat faced. Despite overwhelmingly supporting freedom in the
abstract, when it comes down to practice, the American public have shown they are very
willing to give up these civil liberties if it comes with the promise of security. In 2015
when a number of provisions of the Patriot Act were set to expire, including the measure
that allowed the NSA to secretly collect phone data on its citizens, a full 61% of
Americans approved renewal while only 31% were opposed (CNN 2015). These numbers
were even more drastic when controlling for party affiliation (73% of Republicans
wanted renewal, 63% of Democrats), despite the fact that a number of these provisions
clearly violated fundamental democratic norms. The question raised then is how this in
turn affects the long-term strength of democracy. If people don’t find civil liberties as
important as safety, and their perception of threat is stable and high, will they begin to no
longer support these values at all? Worryingly, and particularly in regard to the United
States, it seems this may be true, indicating this trade-off is perhaps partly to blame for
the gradual decrease of democracy in this country. Unlike in New Zealand, the US
government, with the full support of the American people, tilted their prioritization
towards security, and this has been detrimental to public support for democratic norms in
the long run.
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TurkeyTurkey exists in a different realm than either of the other two cases, as a hybrid
regime with ever increasing authoritarian tendencies. However, less than 20 years ago
they were lauded as the model democracy in the MENA region and positioned as a goal
for every other country with aims of democratization and thus, their inclusion in this
analysis could help shed some light on just exactly what went wrong. Following
independence and the 1924 constitution, Turkey was technically defined as a
parliamentary democracy, however in less than a year the country had transitioned to
single-party rule under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s Republican People’s Party (CHP),which
still exists as the main opposition party in the state. Single-party rule lasted until 1945
when the country held its first free and fair elections with viable opposition parties,
ushering in a new era for the Turkish democratic experiment (Lewis 2002, 303). Since
then, Turkish democracy has had a turbulent existence, with four military coups and four
re-transitions to democracy, each accompanied by a rewriting or heavy revision of the
constitution. The 1982 constitution was ratified in the wake of a military coup and is
technically the one still in use today, however it has been altered and ratified a total of 19
times, in effect re-writing nearly two-thirds (113 of the 177 articles) of the original text
(Eder 2020, 705).
All this is to show that Turkey’s experiment with democracy has been ongoing
since its independence, although it’s been marred by a number of backtracks and
interruptions. Despite all this, by the early 2000s, in large part due to the requirements of
the EU accession process and the new government’s willingness to follow them, Turkey
was viewed by the world as a rising democracy and the model for the rest of the Middle
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East. Particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings in 2011, many in the Western
world were pointing to Turkey as the ideal outcome for states experiencing unrest, a
sentiment further encouraged by then-Prime Minster Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the
ruling AKP. Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) first rose to power in
in 2002 in the wake of the devastating economic crisis of the late 90s, with promises of
economic stability, the cultivation of greater ties to the west, and the strengthening of
democracy. Although from their creation the AKP was clearly an Islamic party in the
supposedly secular state of Turkey, they have retained relatively high support since their
rise to power, with Erdoğan eventually becoming the country’s first-time popularly
elected president in 2014 (Eder 2020, 710). Since then, he has further consolidated power
around himself and gradually increased his authoritarian tendencies, leaving the Turkey
today a much different one politically than the one of fifteen years ago. Turkey was never
close to a perfect democratic state and has certainly had its fair share of corruption
scandals and human rights violations, yet it is inarguable that at a recent point in time
they existed as, at the very least, a flawed democracy.
While gradual change started earlier, most point the attempted coup of 2016 and
the two-year long state of emergency that followed as a true turning point in Turkey’s
transition away from democracy. The heightened security threat following the failed coup
allowed the government to avoid institutional checks and balances in the vague name of
public safety and set the stage for the transition into an executive presidency in 2017
(Eder 2020, 705). Turkey’s gradual turn away from democracy has been accompanied by
mass purges of opponents, increased Islamization of society, major crackdowns on the
media, and growing charges of human rights abuses, particularly in the Southeast where
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the country remains embroiled in a brutal conflict with the PKK and other Kurdish rebel
groups. It’s not that surprising then that in 2016 Freedom House crowned Turkey as the
state with the largest one-year decline in freedom, and then followed this up a year later
in 2017 by reporting that Turkey also had the notoriety of the largest 10-year decline
(Freedom House). Turkey maintained their Freedom House rating of “party free” until
2018 when reports of election fraud finally dropped them down to a score of 32 out of
100, solidly in the “not free” range.
Despite the growing authoritarianism and human rights restrictions Erdoğan’s
approval rating has remained relatively high since he first came to power and, apart from
a relatively small but very vocal opposition to the AKP, citizens retain high confidence in
their government. Due to the economic impacts of the coronavirus pandemic Erdoğan’s
approval rating has recently dropped to 46% from 56% in early 2020 and from a high of
68% in 2016 following the coup (MetroPoll). This essentially puts him in the same field
as most American presidents, who average around the mid-40s, with some jumps in the
wake of crisis (such as George Bush’s 90% shortly after 9/11) or falls in the wake of
scandals (such as Nixon’s 24% during Watergate) (Gallup, “Presidential Approval
Ratings”). What this goes to show is that Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism hasn’t
really changed his approval all that much, and although there have been gradual
decreases, ultimately Turks seem accepting of his leadership and the state of their
democracy right now.
A large part of this confidence and approval of a nondemocratic regime seems to
stem originally from Erdogan’s harsh approach to terrorism and suspected terrorists. Due
to historical grievances, ongoing regional conflicts, and Turkey’s key geopolitical
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position, over the past two decades they have faced terrorist threats from a wide range of
groups with ties to ISIL, al-Qaeda, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), and a number of
radical Marxist-Leninist groups such as the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party
Front (DHKP/C) and the Urgent Ones (Zeldin 2015). The PKK in particular has been
involved in a tense conflict with the Turkish government since 1984 which, by some
estimates, has killed over 60,000 people and displaced thousands (Unal 2011; Crisis
Group 2021).4 It’s crucial to recognize just how instrumental the PKK is in just about
every decision the Turkish government makes. The PKK, and the fight for Kurdish
separatism in general, is considered by many Turks to be an existential threat to their
survival, and thus this attitude is incredibly influential in driving both their domestic and
foreign policy.
The PKK conflict has been economically, socially, and psychologically costly and
to cope with this violence the Turkish governments over the years have implemented
numerous polices, ranging from micro-level adjustments in security related issues to
macro-level social and political reform. To most political elites, especially the current
Erdoğan administration, these groups are a threat to the Turkish identity, and thus they
must be wiped out and forgotten, resulting in a trend of counterterrorism policies being
very broad in their potential application to thwart terrorism. Because this conflict is ever
going and ever changing, the government likes to have the leeway to apply terrorism

4

It should be noted that, while the US and Turkey (as well as the EU and a number of other states) classify
the PKK as a terrorist group, this is actually a somewhat controversial label and various NGOs have
disputed this claim by contending that the PKK does not systematically target civilians and thus it is more
accurate to consider them a “militant political organization” or an “armed guerilla movement” (Zeldin
2015)
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legislation against alleged perpetrators no matter how the overall situation may transition,
and thus while most polices are seemingly extensive and aimed at terrorism in general,
they often have been implemented thinking particularly about the PKK (Unal 2011).
This method of policy implementation is exactly opposite of that which transpired
in New Zealand, as the bulk of the various policies focused solely on PKK members and
those affiliated with them, rather than addressing the underlying grievances or causes of
the violent opposition. While obviously the New Zealand government wasn’t able to
target the malicious existence of Islamophobia, which was the true cause of their attack,
they were able to more closely focus on the tools and opportunities at the disposal of the
attacker, rather than a specific group of like-minded people, and this perhaps plays a role
in their comparative success. The intricacies of Turkish-Kurdish relations could fill an
entire book, so what’s key to note here is that this conflict has existed for decades, is
recognized as especially brutal and often inhumane, and has left citizens on both sides
living in a state of constant tension and fear.
In 2015 the tentative ceasefire between the Turkish government and the PKK fell
apart and violence immediately escalated, rapidly spreading across the country and
resulting in over 400 people being killed in terrorist attacks between July 2015 and early
2017 (Soliev 2017). At the same time, 2014 saw the rise of ISIL as a global threat, and
the formation of the US-led international coalition intervening in the region to fight back,
which caused even further tension within Turkey as Western states began to support the
YPG troops Turkey saw as PKK affiliated. ISIL and related splinter groups began
attacking civilian targets in Turkey, carrying out the deadliest attack in modern Turkish
history in October 2015, when suicide bombers targeted a rally for peace in Ankara,
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killing 95 people and injuring 246 (Soliev 2017). This was the first in a near constant
series of attacks over the next two years, with ISIL targeting civilians and the PKK
targeting military and police, creating a tense environment of fear. In light of this, it’s
easy to see why the Global Terrorism Index ranks Turkey as 18th out of 135, firmly
positioning them into the “high impact” category. Enter into this same two-year period
the attempted coup of 2016 and the growing fear of domestic terror and violence, it’s no
wonder at all that in the most recent wave of the WVS Turks overwhelmingly prioritized
security over freedom (60% to 40%). The continuation of occasional sporadic attacks
from multiple sources, combined with the government’s constant use of us vs. them
rhetoric keeps the perception of threat very high in the daily lives of Turks, and helps
explain why many citizens remain overwhelmingly supportive of harsh counterterrorism
laws.
This is easily illustrated in the lack of resistance Erdoğan and his government
received when passing a number of vaguely worded, power enhancing, terrorism laws
shortly following the attempted coup. These new laws enabled Turkish authorities to
detain a wide range of people with very little evidence, enhanced police powers to
conduct searchers, allowed the use weapons against persons suspected of terrorism,
strengthened government control of the internet, and expanded the power of the National
Intelligence Agency (MiT). The way all these new terrorism laws have affected the media
is perhaps most striking, as journalists are now regularly detained for up to eight years for
“spreading terrorist propaganda,” often times in ways as seemingly innocuous as using a
picture of a suspected terrorist or reporting on the activities of MiT (Zeldin 2015). In the
purges following the attempted coup 16 television broadcasters and 45 newspapers were
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closed by the government and 160 journalists were imprisoned alongside over 77,000
judges, teachers, police, and civil servants (Eder 2020). Importantly, while there have
certainly been protest and criticism directed at the government for their treatment of
journalists and academics, no one is quite willing to sacrifice the sense of security most
of these policies bring.
Even though the threat of terrorism has greatly decreased since the tense period of
2015/16, the government continues to use these terrorism laws to detain essentially
anyone it sees fit, primarily now for alleged ties to the PKK and any of their affiliates, or
connections with the Gülen Movement whom the government still believes was
ultimately behind the coup (an accusation Gülen himself vehemently denies). Just this
past December (2020) Turkey enacted the Law on Preventing Financing of Proliferation
of WMDs which enables the Interior Minster to target the legitimate and lawful activities
of NGOs it finds “suspect” (HRW 2020). While the stated aim is to prevent the financing
of terrorist groups this new law essentially just allows the government to restrict and
control the actions of NGOs or other groups it doesn’t like for whatever reason, making it
a very dangerous tool to limit the freedom of association. Added to the countless targeted
laws already in existence, Turkey’s terrorism legislation has helped to consolidate power
around Erdoğan and allowed him to restrict rights as he sees fit by claiming this in some
way keeps citizens safe. It’s important here to also recognize that without the heightened
sense of fear following the coup and the numerous deadly attacks in this two-year period,
it’s unlikely Erdoğan would have had as much success in gathering support to amend the
Constitution and abolish the office of the Prime Minister in 2017. People were scared,
Erdoğan had a very high approval rating and confidence he could solve the terrorist
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threat, and for many this was enough to grant the executive much greater power and
reach; a decision that has had a significant impact on the failed democratic experiment.
Further, and crucially to this thesis, despite the relative lack of major terrorist activity in
recent years and despite the obvious authoritarianism of the government, the public
remains generally supportive of these policies and their regime.
Clearly, Turkey is not a democracy. As noted above, Freedom House rates them
as “not free” and has recorded decreases in electoral rights and civil liberties every year.
Some see the situation a little more positively, such as the Economist Democracy Index
which labels Turkey a “hybrid regime,” but one that has seen significant electoral
improvement over the past year, with stronger performing opposition parties, higher
turnout rates, and increased citizen participation in demonstrations all serving as positive
signs (EIU 2020). At the same time however, civil liberties scores remain dismally low
by every index and the government remains engaged in actions that directly target
freedoms, such as their withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention (also known as the
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic
Violence) on March 21, 2021. Whether we recognize Turkey as an autocracy or a hybrid
regime, it’s clear that it’s no longer the model democracy it was just a decade ago, and
while, of course, many factors are involved in this transition, the heightened security
threat and the fear it evoked seem to be a crucial player.
Regional conflicts and the rise of ISIL generated a very real fear that has
remained and fermented even as ISIL began to lose strength in the region, causing
citizens to continue to prioritize safety above all else. This desire was eagerly met by
Erdoğan’s government, partly by necessity and partly due to the obvious advantages it
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gave them in consolidating power. As the government continues to crack down on
terrorism and security threats in any form, citizens remain relatively supportive, all the
while the belief that democracy is important continues to decline. Citizens care most
about security and are willing to overlook restrictions on their freedoms (particularly free
speech) to achieve it, and it seems this is further contributing to the general decline of
democratic support in the state. The AKP’s security policies, while somewhat draconian,
also seem to have successfully decreased terrorist activity in the state, seeing as the last
major terrorist attack occurred in 2017, and this certainly further fuels the belief that
some of these restricted democratic values aren’t all that necessary after all. Since the 80s
and the start of the Kurdish conflict, Turkey has consistently and, then aggressively,
prioritized security above all else, leaving us with a former democratic regime where
many of the citizens no longer seem to support the norms they once so highly valued. In
the question of balance between freedom and security, Turkey leaned hard towards the
latter, in a tend that has proven detrimental to democracy.
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CHAPTER V
Data Analysis
Democracy and Freedom:
With a solid foundation in place for each of these three regimes we can turn to an
examination of some key WVS data to determine if these government policy choices
truly have had an effect on the long-term strength of democracy. By measuring survey
responses over successive waves of the WVS I can gain a better understanding of how
public opinion towards democracy in both the abstract and in practice has shifted over the
past 20 years. Simultaneously, I will examine indicators that address terrorism and
security to better gauge how attitudes towards the current environment and security
policy may have changed support for these norms. Many of the indicators have been
asked over multiple waves of the World Values Survey and thus a time series analysis is
possible, however this isn’t available for every question, as will be further explained
below. As discussed by the likes of Ferrín and Kriesi (2016), most of these indicators,
particularly when it comes to questions of democracy, ask either about the ideal/abstract
or about the actual practice or evaluation of that measure. Thus, the question on
“importance of democracy” deals with the abstract concept, whereas “democratization of
own country” deals with how democratic the respondent views their own government. I
will be analyzing both types of responses in order to get a better sense of the bigger
picture of democratic strength in these three cases. I’ll begin this analysis by examining
indicators that address democracy and freedom before tying in responses related to
terrorism and security.
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The measure of “importance of democracy,” very specifically asks “how
important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically?” and has
respondents answer on a scale where 1 means “not at all important” and 10 means
“absolutely important.” This question is key to this analysis because it measures what
Norris (2011), Weßels (2015), Thomassen and van Ham (2017), and Ferrín and Kriesi
(2016) all refer to as the abstract or ideal understanding of democracy, rather than
democracy in practice. This is why it’s not all that surprising, reflecting on the findings of
Shin and Kim (2018), that this indicator remains relatively high across most states,
because many people still recognize democracy as the preferrable or ideal system. What’s
crucial to note however, is that this measure, while still overall relatively high, is
gradually decreasing across a wide range of states. For instance, time series analysis
indicates that the importance of democracy is steadily decreasing in Turkey, dropping
from 87% in 2005-9, to 77% in 2010-14, and to 60% in 2017-20 (see Figure 1).5 While
not as extreme, the United States’ scores have also dropped, from 74% in 2005-9, to 72%
in 2010-14, and to 70% in 2017-20. The change over time in the US is comparatively
small, however it does still seem to indicate a declining trend in how people view
democracy. Meanwhile, New Zealand stands out as one of the few countries that has
increased on this indicator within the past decade, with scores rising from 80% in 201014 to 85% in 2017-20 (WVS data was not available in 2005-9). This indicator alone
already provides evidence towards my argument, for the data taken together show the

5

For clarities sake, the 1-10 scale in the WVS was further broken down into 3 categories based on
respondents rating democracy 1-3, 4-7, and 8-10. A similar method has been used for other indicators that
were answered on a 1-10 scale, see Appendix B for the full, un-collapsed data.
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belief in democracy’s importance drastically declining in Turkey, slowly but steadily
decreasing in the US, and steadily rising in New Zealand. Importantly, these responses
from recent waves of the WVS seem to contradict some of the findings of previous
scholars in this field, most of whom were utilizing various datasets that only collected
responses until 2015, indicating that potentially important changes have occurred in the
past five years.
Norris (2011), Weßels (2015), Thomassen and van Ham (2017), and Ferrín and
Kriesi (2016) all ultimately found support for democratic norms and democracy to be
stable across time, but it’s possible this has begun to change, as a clear decrease is visible
in a number of states. Besides Turkey and the US, Sweden, Australia, Chile, and South
Korea all saw decreases in their scores as well, indicating this trend may be widespread.
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Figure 1- Importance of Democracy
Source: 2005-2020 World Values Survey
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It must be noted that a number of other states, including France, Germany, and Japan saw
their scores increase slightly, so this slight variation by country echoes the worries that
Thomassen and van Ham had over regional fluctuations. While it’s true there is variation
by country and this certainly demands further research, enough countries have seen
steady decreases in recent years that we can’t discount this as a “normal and
unremarkable” fluctuation as doing so could be detrimental to long-term democratic
survival.
Juxtaposing this indicator with an analysis of citizens evaluations of democracy in
their own country adds another layer of complication, particularly in the case of Turkey.
Weßels (2015) and Ferrín and Kriesi (2017) found citizens in Europe to ultimately see
their democracies as performing negatively in a number of key regards (and found they
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were often correct in these evaluations), yet this trend isn’t as clear when looking at nonEuropean democracies. The WVS question asks respondents “how democratically is the
country being run today” using a similar 10-point scale ranging from “not at all” to
“completely.” Using the same categorizations into three groups as I did with the
importance of democracy measure, Turks rate the democratization of their country as
fluctuating from 28% in 2005-9, to 37% in 2010-14, back down to 32% in 2017-20 (see
Figure 2 below, and Figure 2.5 in Appendix B). What’s notable here is that, even to an
outside observer relying purely on data from Freedom House and EIU, it would be clear
that Turkey has gotten consistently less democratic under the AKP government, with
2015/6 arguably marking the true end of Turkish democracy. Yet, Turks still see their
government as relatively democratic, in fact, more so than respondents in the US which
scored 28% in 2017-20 (down from 33% in 2010-14 and 34% in 2005-9). While the US
certainly has had some major problems with their democracy these past few years, there
isn’t much of an argument to claim that it is less democratic than Turkey, but that’s what
the collective citizens seem to think.
Likewise, 28% of Turks were “completely satisfied” with the performance of their
political system in 2020, versus only 12% in the United States (and interestingly, only
18% in New Zealand). This is reminiscent of Shin and Kim’s argument that, even though
everyone can define democracy, most people are unable (or perhaps unwilling) to
correctly identify their own regime. There is a clear disconnect between the way citizens
understand the ideal of democracy and how the evaluate it in practice, which many
previous studies have explored, and these two indicators seem to prove. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, New Zealand again stands out with 58% of respondents recognizing the
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country as democratic in Wave 7, up from 53% the previous wave (and again data was
not available for wave 5: 2005-9). When one considers that New Zealand regularly
ranks as one of the most democratic countries in the world, these numbers do feel a bit
low, perhaps indicating that citizens are very harsh critics of their own regimes, yet
comparatively they clearly recognize that they are doing better than either Turkey or the
United States. This all indicates that the “democratic deficit” exists across all states, no
matter how democratic they are, when citizens’ ideals and evaluations differ, and so the
real worry is that it seems to be growing.
Further evidence of a disconnect between reality and abstract can be found in the
two indicators of “having a democratic political system” and “satisfaction with current
system” (Figure 3 and Figure 4). In Turkey the idea of having a democratic political
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system is rated as “very good” or “fairly good” by 77% of respondents, and while this
has decreased slightly over the past few waves, it remains comparatively very high. At
the same time however, satisfaction with the current system (which is not a democracy) is
also very high, with 28.6% of respondents saying they were “completely satisfied” with
the political system (answered 8-10 on the scale). In comparison, only 12.2% of
Americans and 18.9% of New Zealanders are “completely satisfied,” despite very high
percentages answering that a democratic system was “very good” or “fairly good” (82%
and 83% respectively). While one could argue this discrepancy makes some sense in the
US, where democracy is clearly faltering and thus the performance of the system may be
harshly judged, it makes less sense in New Zealand, clearly a strong democracy, or
Turkey, clearly a growing autocracy. Yet again, it seems citizens have trouble connecting
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the abstract and the reality, and don’t always recognize their own system for what it is.
This also shows that performance ratings for these regimes are, in general, incredibly
low, which is very worrying for long term legitimacy of the regimes. As Weßels (2015)
cautioned, low performance ratings can quickly transition into decreasing support for
fundamental norms, and if the WVS indicators for the importance of democracy are to be
believed, this is already occurring. If citizens can’t even recognize democracy when they
have it, how would they even realize it was in danger of decline?
When we consider other factors that may play into overall democratic evaluations,
based on Thomassen and van Ham’s indicators for measuring political support, we can
start to make better sense of how citizens of a country like Turkey evaluate their regime
as more democratic than those in the United States. For instance, Turkey scores near the
very top on the WVS question asking about national pride (61% are “very proud” and
27% “quite proud” (see Figure 5)) and scores the highest of the three cases in terms of
confidence in government (69% either have “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence)
and thus it’s not that surprising that they still recognize their government and regime as
ultimately democratic or “good.” In comparison, in the United States only 46% of
respondents said they were “very proud” of their country and only 8% have “a great deal”
of confidence in the government, while only 25% have “quite a lot.” Furthermore,
confidence in the government has decreased slightly over time in the United States, with
combined scores of “a great deal” and “quite a lot” dropping from 37% in 2005-9 to 33%
in 2010-14, while the percentage saying they have no confidence at all jumped from 14%
to 29% between 2014 and 2017 (See Figure 6 below). Likewise, feelings of national pride
have also been steadily decreasing in the United States, from a high of 77% feeling “very
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proud” in 1994-98 all the way down to 46% in the most recent wave. While this is,
comparatively, still quite high, it’s important to recognize how much this percentage has
fallen and continues to decline every year. Meanwhile in Turkey feelings of national
pride have remained steadily high since the WVS began asking this question, but they
have fluctuated somewhat randomly, from a shocking high of 81% “very proud” of their
country in 1994, down to 62% the following wave, back up to 74% after that, and so on,
with no real discernible pattern.
Again, unsurprisingly, New Zealanders’ have the most national pride of the three
cases in the most recent wave, scoring just above Turkey with 67.7% “very proud.” Like
Turkey there has been some mild fluctuation in percentage of respondents feeling “very
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proud,” however it has remained steadily between 60 and 70% since the 90s. New
Zealanders also have very high levels of confidence in their government that continues to
increase every year, with 38% either having “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence
in 2005-9, up to 45% in 2010-14, and to 50% in 2017-20.
Even a country like New Zealand doesn’t quite have the confidence levels seen in
Turkey however, for, over this same time period, confidence in government has
continued to rise, from 54% in 2009 to 59% in 2014, to 69% in 2020 while
simultaneously the percentage with no confidence has dropped from 20% to 15% to 8%.
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This is particularly interesting because it shows that even in the face of events or
situations we’d expect to decrease confidence in government, such as Erdoğan’s
crackdown on free speech post-2016, confidence has actually remained quite high in
Turkey, and significantly higher than in the comparably more democratic United States.
This seems counterintuitive at first glance, for while we know Erdoğan has many
supporters, he also faces significant opposition so this high degree of confidence in the
government seems misplaced or exaggerated. It seems possible that, despite intense
criticism for human rights violations, citizens have a general approval for the government
taking charge and not letting the west “push them around” anymore. It seems this takecharge attitude, combined with very real improvements to the economy, has resulted in a
higher degree of confidence than an outside observer would expect, perhaps akin to the
support and confidence Putin maintains in Russia even while the world knows he
amounts to little more than a brutal dictator.
This is further enforced by the indicator measuring citizens preference for a strong
leader who doesn’t have to “bother with parliament or elections,” essentially asking if
they would support an authoritarian leaning leader who is largely unaccountable to other
branches of government (Figure 7). Not that surprisingly, given their history, Turks are
relatively accepting of a strongman style leader, and although the percentage responding
this is “very good” has decreased slightly over the past 3 waves (21% to 17% to 15%),
when you also consider the percentage responding that this is “fairly good,” the
acceptance has remained steadily around 50% since 2004. This is further evidence as to
why Turks may remain confident in a government that is increasingly cracking down on
rights and taking away freedoms, because, despite these things, the government is seen as
71

Support for Having A Strong Leader
(who does not have to bother with parliament or elections)
Very good

Fairly good

Bad

Very bad

120%
100%
35%
16%

21%

17%

13%

53%

51%

52%

58%

15%

6%

4%

4%

4%
2017-2020

14%

2010-2014

9%

2005-2009

21%

1994-1998

37%

2017-2020

34%

2010-2014

32%

2005-2009

80%

47%

60%
40%

12%

9%

2017-2020

1994-1998

27%

USA

Turkey

1999-2004

6%

1999-2004

7%

2010-2014

8%

2005-2009

3%

1999-2004

0%

1994-1998

20%

New Zealand

Figure 7- Support for Having a Strong Leader
Source: 1994-2020 World Values Survey

“strong,” and a strong government offers the most protection. If people are seriously
worried about their safety (as we’ll see below they are in Turkey), it’s understandable
that a leader who can act immediately and forcefully and doesn’t have potential to get
bogged down by other branches and democratic processes would be appealing. Even
those who recognize Erdoğan as an authoritarian may still believe he has brought greater
safety to their lives and thus maintain a degree of confidence in his government in spite
of the rights restrictions. This indicates as well that, in the grand scheme of things, these
rights being restricted are not as important in performance and confidence assessments as
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security, and thus don’t play as big of a role in how citizens evaluate their own regime
and government.
Concerningly, on this same indicator of having a strong leader who doesn’t have
to bother with parliament or elections, the United States has steadily increased their
approval every year. The percentage of Americans responding that a strongman style
leader is “very good” or “fairly good” has risen from 32% in 2005-9, to 34% in 2010-14
and now with the most recent results from 2017-20 indicating a worrying 38% are
accepting of a semi-unaccountable leader. This seems to be a sharp contradiction to the
70% that state democracy is important and serves as further evidence of the falling
position of certain democratic norms in American society. An unaccountable leader is
antithesis to one of the core foundations of democracy and, although only 12% of
Americans believe this is “very good,” that’s still too many, and the fact this number has
been steadily increasing since the first wave this question was asked (1999-2004) is very
worrying. Americans seem to value immediate action over democratic process, and this
could perhaps partly be explained by the ever-present sense of threat they feel. When the
Patriot Act was enacted within a month of the 9/11 attacks there was initially very little
hesitation or protest from the general public, even though it was clear the legislators
themselves didn’t really know what they were passing (Cole and Dempsey 2006). When
people are scared, their security takes precedent over democratic values, and thus they
will willingly accept or even prefer, a semi-accountable leader who will “get things done”
and help them feel safe. Contrary to both Turkey and the US, New Zealand has steadily
maintained much lower scores on this indicator, with 4% responding a strong leader is
“very good” in each of the past 3 waves, and the percentage stating it is “very bad”
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increasing from 51% to 58%. This is perhaps partly due to the significantly lower level of
threat they feel than either Turks or Americans, but also indicates how seriously both the
citizens and the government prioritize freedoms and democratic values over all other
concerns.
We can observe very similar patterns when we examine other confidence
measures, particularly confidence in parliament (Figure 8) and confidence in political
parties (Figure 9). Like government, confidence in the parliament in Turkey continues to
rise, although at a more gradual rate, with 59% of respondents answering they had either
“a great deal” or “quite a lot” in the most recent wave. The percentage of respondents
with “a great deal” of confidence has decreased every year since 2005, from 22%, to 17%
and now to 12%, however those responding “quite a lot” has continued to increase while
those with no confidence at all decreases steadily. Similarly, in New Zealand confidence
in parliament also continues to increase gradually, with 39% answering they have “a
great deal” or “quite a lot” in the 2017-20 wave, up from 14% in 1994-8. Notably, of
course, they still rank below Turkey in terms of confidence levels, despite the fact
Turkey’s parliament is considered relatively impotent and is the target of frequent
corruption charges, while New Zealand’s is generally considered to be strongly
democratic. Meanwhile, just like with government, in the United States confidence
continues to decline, with 20% of Americans responding they had no confidence at all in
2017-20, combined with 60% responding “not very much,” indicating a solid majority of
the population has no trust or confidence in the legislature. Again, this isn’t that
surprising when one considers the growing polarization of American society and the
complete gridlock this has caused in both houses, but it still is means for concern.
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Figure 8- Confidence in Parliament and Figure 9- Confidence in Parties
Source: 1994-2020 World Values Survey
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In looking at confidence in parties, we see a very similar trend, with the one
difference being that none of the cases have all that much confidence in political parties
to begin with. In the United States, there has certainly been a slight decline since the 90s,
with those with no confidence at all dropping from 16% in 1998 to 24% in 2020;
however, when we factor in those with “not very much” confidence as well, this score
has been consistently above 75% since 1994. In Turkey there has been a bit more
fluctuation, with 1999-2004 serving as a low point with 45% of respondents answering
they had no confidence at all and scores slowly increasing from then, resulting in only
10% with no confidence and 50% having “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in
the most recent wave.
This is perhaps most surprising out of all the confidence measures in the WVS
due to well documented corruption and government control of parties in Turkey. Since
the 90s there have been various laws in place to keep Kurdish affiliated parties or other
groups unfavorable to the government from gaining any traction, including a shockingly
high threshold of 10% to gain seats in the Grand National Assembly (HRW 2021). This
has only intensified under Erdoğan, as indicated just last month (March 2021) by a case
being brought against the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the third largest party in
Turkey’s parliament, accusing them of colluding with the PKK and attempting to ban the
popular party entirely (BBC 2021). While actions like this speak more to the corruption
of the government, the fact that it’s clear parties only operate successfully with Erdoğan’s
approval raises questions over why citizens have so much confidence in the parties
(unless of course this is the same confidence they have in the government in general, just
transferred over to yet another arm of Erdoğan’s). This incident also provides further
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evidence as to the public’s acceptance of rights restrictions when done with a veil of
security purposes, as Erdoğan linked the HDP to the terrorist group PKK to help control
criticism or protest.
Finally, much like with the other confidence indicators, New Zealand has seen a
steady increase in party confidence, albeit starting from a low point of 32% of citizens
with none at all in 1994-8. In the 2017-20 wave 12% of respondents had no confidence in
parties and 19% had either “a great deal” or “quite a lot,” placing them in a better
position than the US, but still nowhere near Turkey’s level. Similarly as in a number of
European countries, it seems there is a growing sense that, even though New Zealand is a
multiparty system, the same few parties are always in control and these “traditional
parties and politicians don’t care about [me]” (Duncan 2018, 115). In New Zealand’s
case, although they switched from a First Past the Post to a Mixed Member Proportional
electoral system in 1993 (modeled after the German system), their political system
essentially remains a “Labour-or-National duopoly,” with the inclusion of three other
rotating parties in parliament (119).
While this has led some to warn of an eventual populist or nationalist uprising
leading to the emergence of more radical outsider parties, as seen in Europe and the
United States, most scholars of New Zealand’s political system find there to be some
dissatisfaction, but not a desire for full systemic change. Thus, their low (compared to
Turkey) score of confidence in parties may be more of a reflection of this desire for
minor change in the existing party structure, particularly in terms of greater inclusion of
Maori interests, rather than a belief that the party system doesn’t work at all, as is the
case in the United States. On any international comparison, New Zealand’s electoral and
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governmental systems are consistently rated very highly for observing values such as
human rights, freedoms, and transparency, and survey evidence makes it abundantly clear
that New Zealanders are more satisfied with democracy and parties now (and
increasingly more so each year) than they were before MPP (Duncan 2018). A general
distrust in political parties seems to be a universally shared sentiment, although when
considered in relation to current events confidence can seem misplaced or arbitrarily
decided. The intense gridlock and affective polarization in the United States may
somewhat justify the low confidence in institutions, although it certainly seems to be a bit
exaggerated. Meanwhile the opposite seems to be true in Turkey, where confidence is
overly exaggerated for a government that frequently and aggressively cracks down on
human rights, seemingly based primarily on economic and foreign policy concerns.
Unlike Turkey, a clear autocracy, and the United States, a faltering hybrid regime, New
Zealand remains consistently more committed to democracy and democratic principles,
and this is apparent in nearly every indicator used by the WVS.
Particularly when we examine some of the WVS group of questions on the
“essential characteristics of democracy” over time we can clearly see Turkey’s fall away
from democracy and New Zealand’s continual rise, while the US fluctuates in the middle,
presenting somewhat of an enigma. For instance, one of the questions asks if the
respondent believes civil rights protect people’s liberty against oppression, on a scale
with 1 meaning they do not think it’s an essential characteristic of democracy and 10
meaning it is (Figure 10). Again, since this is measuring the ideal rather than the practice,
the numbers are high across the board, but there is a very obvious trend for both New
Zealand and Turkey. In 2005-9 70% of Turks responded that civil rights that protect
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people’s liberty was an essential characteristic (answered 8-10), but this dropped to 57%
the following wave, and further still to 49% in 2017-20. Unfortunately for New Zealand
we only have responses from two waves, but we can still see a significant increase from
54% saying they were essential in 2010-14, to 64% in 2017-20. Clearly, the concept of
civil rights is being evaluated as increasingly less important in Turkey, which goes right
along with their decreasing belief that democracy is important, while the exact opposite is
true in New Zealand. There is less of a trend visible in the United States, where the
percentage viewing civil rights as essential has fluctuated from 62% in 2005-9, to 54% in
2010-14, back up to 57% in 2017-20. All these numbers remain high, indicating that
overall Americans still find civil rights to be an important component of democracy in the
abstract, but the fluctuation does perhaps point to the insecurity and uncertainty
Americans have with larger concept of democracy itself.
These same trends repeat themselves in other questions within this category of
“essential characteristics,” such as one that questions respondents on the importance of
free elections. In New Zealand those believing free elections to be essential increased
from 77% in 2010-14 to 83% in 2017-20, while in Turkey it steadily decreased from 76%
in 2005-9, to 70% in 2010-14, to 54% in 2017-20 (Figure 11). Interestingly, elections in
Turkey have been increasingly evaluated by observers as corrupt and unfree, especially
after the attempted coup in 2016, so the large drop from 70% to 54% over this period is
somewhat surprising. Instinctively you’d think that as the right to free and fair elections
was taken away it would be viewed as more important, but instead it’s seen as
significantly less essential. This is perhaps indicative of Turks’ desire to still see their
country as a democracy, and thus they view some of the foundational democratic features
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as less essential so as to allow them to still convince themselves their regime fits the
mold. Alternatively, this decreasing evaluation of election importance could also reflect
the grim acceptance Turks have that their elections are corrupt and therefore potentially
meaningless. Thus, this would indicate a growing apathy towards democratic norms
rather than an outright willingness to turn away from them.
Likewise, for the question asking if women and men having the same rights is
essential for democracy Turk’s response dropped from 78% saying this is essential in
2005-9, to 67%, to 58% in the most recent wave (Figure 12). Following the same trend,
New Zealand’s responses increased from 80% to 85% saying women and men having
the same rights is essential, presenting still further evidence to democratic strengthening
in New Zealand and weakening in Turkey. Again, for both the above questions responses
in the United States fluctuated a bit but ultimately remained relatively steady, with 6970% saying free elections are essential and 69-72% saying gender equality is. All of this
together just goes to show how fundamental democratic norms are drastically losing
support in Turkey while steadily gaining support in New Zealand, essentially confirming
what we already knew about creeping authoritarianism under President Erdoğan and
healthy democracy under Prime Minster Ardern. The United States meanwhile is harder
to place fully following either trend, going right along with their current status as a weak
democracy or even as a growing hybrid regime. Support for these fundamental norms in
the US fluctuate but remain steadily in the middle of the two other cases, cementing their
position as not quite a healthy democracy, but not yet an authoritarian regime either. This
however is a precarious position as fluctuations can quickly turn into a downward trend if
they receive the right catalyst.
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While the analysis thus far has explored the strength of democracy and revealed
some interesting trends, it hasn’t really yet touched on evidence as to why these trends
may be occurring and thus, I turn my attention now to measure of security and fears of
terrorism.

Terrorism and SecurityIn the post-9/11 environment most states quickly made moves to strengthen and
update their counterterrorism policies and laws in an effort to be more prepared for this
new type of terrorist threat. Unfortunately, as I’ve already touched on, freedom and
security are most often thought of as a balance, wherein strengthening one detracts from
the other. In an effort to explore how the general population feels about this balance, the
most recent wave of the World Values Survey (2017-2020) asks very specifically if the
respondent thinks security or freedom is more important and, while a time series analysis
is unavailable because this question has only been asked once, the results are still worth
examining. Crucially, they reveal that nearly every state, across the board, places security
first.6 In fact, the only states in which respondents prioritized freedom were the United
States (very highly at 69.5%), Australia (at 51.2%), and New Zealand (at 47.3%, just
barely over the 42% who responded freedom). Of the 49 states asked this question
respondents in the majority of them significantly value security over freedom,
unsurprisingly with the autocratic states ranking the highest (with Indonesia at the very

6

It should be noted that a number of European countries were not asked this question, in either the WVS
or any of the ESS of the same time range, and thus can’t be included in this analysis (See Figure 13.5 in
Appendix B for all states included)
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top with 95% responding security). In Turkey respondents place security first at a rate of
59% versus 39% who said freedom, putting them in the same middle category of a
general 60-40 split as the likes of Greece, South Korea, and Germany (Figure 13).

Which Is More Important: Freedom Vs. Security
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Figure 13- Which is More Important: Freedom vs. Security
Source: 2017-2020 World Values Survey

It is somewhat surprising that so many democracies place security first, when it’s
well acknowledged that prioritizing security often negatively affects freedom, providing
strong evidence that civil liberties may be decreasing, but that people are ultimately
accepting of this if it comes with a guarantee of safety. Of the states asked this question
in Wave 7, over half qualify as either a “democracy” (7 of 49) or a “flawed democracy”
(16 of 49) according to the EIU 2020, and thus while not as many states were asked this
question as ideally hoped, we can still observe some interesting trends. Particularly when
we combine this data with evidence gained from other indicators, it begins to help shed
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some light on a potential explanation for the decrease of support for democratic values in
some key states.
As Silver and Davis found in their analysis of the US after 9/11, citizens were
overwhelmingly okay with harsh security policy, even when it blatantly restricted their
rights, because the fear of future terrorist attack was so high. It seems this tradeoff
between security and freedom is an easy decision for many, and, if you ascribe to
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, is to be expected as it’s human nature to place safety and
self-preservation above just about everything else (Silver and Davis 2004). One of the
biggest questions raised here is thus: what explains the unusually high score in the United
States? While I can’t definitively conclude anything with only response from one wave of
the WVS, it seems, similarly to questions of democracy, when respondents are evaluating
freedom and security there is a discrepancy between what they see as the ideal and how
they evaluate their own country, or even what they think is best for their country. It’s also
quite possible that, had this question been asked in the past few waves as well, it actually
has been decreasing, but began from a higher starting point than some of the other states.
I say this because, if we look at other indicators, such as fear of terrorism, or perceptions
of security in their own neighborhood, the US has greatly been increasing, showing
higher levels of fear and lower perceptions of safety, indicating that a desire for security
may be growing. In terms of security in their own neighborhood, the percentage of
Americans responding “very secure” dropped from 26% in 2010-14 down to 12% in
2017-20, matching a general global trend in decreasing perceptions of security (Figure
14). For the same time period Turkey dropped from 25% down to 8%, Germany dropped
from 59% to 27%, Australia from 29% to 16% and Japan from an already low 11% down
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to 3%. New Zealand again is an outlier, increasing slightly from 27% to 33%. It must be
noted that this indicator is somewhat vague, and a change in perception of neighborhood
security could be the result of violent acts such as terrorism but could also indicate if
people are insecure due to more localized crime, gentrification, racism, etc. and thus we
can’t draw too many strict conclusions about terrorism based on this measure alone. That
being said, it remains notable that this is a somewhat global phenomenon of decreased
perceptions of security, matched by a high rate of prioritizing security over freedom,
which seems to provide evidence to a bigger picture.
To measure terrorism more specifically, the WVS indicator of “fear of a terrorist
attack” is much more telling and indicates that again, there has been a near universal
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Figure 14-Feelings of Security in Neighborhood
Source: 2017-2020 World Values Survey
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increase over the past ten years. In the United States the percentage responding they are
“very much” afraid of a terrorist attack increased from 18% to 28%, while those
responding “a great deal” increased from 35% to 40%, meaning over half the population
now fears a terrorist attack (Figure 15). In Turkey meanwhile responses rose from 35% to
43% for “very much” and from 33% to 43% for “a great deal,” indicating nearly 90% of
Turkish citizens fear terrorism. Even New Zealand saw a slight increase, for while the
percentage responding “very much” decreased by one point from 13% to 12%, those
responding “a great deal” increased from 9% to 20%, putting the overall fear level at
32%. It also is worth noting that, while the most recent wave ran from 2017-2020,
responses for this question in New Zealand were gathered at an unspecified time in 2019.
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This is important because the Christchurch Massacre, the greatest terrorist attack in New
Zealand’s history, occurred in late 2019 and thus, it’s quite possible the responses were
recorded before this event, meaning it’s likely another increase followed this attack.
These increases in fear are in many cases understandable based on events and current
situations in these states and on a more global scale. For instance, Turkey’s increase of
almost 20 points lines up with an increase in both frequency and brutality of attacks in
public places, both by ISIS and Kurdish separatist affiliated groups, making this drastic
leap entirely warranted.
People are clearly scared, and increasingly growing more so, worried about
terrorism, feeling unsafe in their neighborhoods and thus, perhaps justifiably, putting
security interests above freedoms. Terrorism is of course a very real threat and has
affected all three of these states in devastating ways, making this fear understandable,
however, it’s important to recognize the ways in which it may be exaggerated. It seems in
many instances this heightened fear isn’t due to any sort of change in risk, but rather due
to changes in our perception of risk. For example, examining the annual Gallup poll
measuring a similar question of American fears of terrorism reveals that the percentage of
Americans very or somewhat concerned with being a victim of an attack hasn’t gone
below 40% since 9/11. What’s striking about this is the fact that, following the 1995
bombing in Oklahoma, this percentage was also at 42%, however within just a couple of
years dropped back down to the low 20s, which had been the norm since the introduction
of this question (Gallup, “Terrorism”). After 9/11 however there was no real drop and
instead, as the WVS data indicates, there’s actually been a steady increase in fear.
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This is despite the fact that there has actually been a decrease in the impact of
terrorism in the United States (GTI 2020). The US State Department reported that,
between 2001 and 2014 there were 3,412 deaths in the United States attributed to
terrorism, which, while certainly still a tragedy, pales in comparison to the 440,095
deaths from firearms during that same period (Vox, 2017). This is not at all to discount
these deaths or to belittle the fears people have over these acts, merely to point out that,
while certainly a risk, terrorism exists as a much lower threat than many believe. There
are, of course, countless explanations for this imbalance between fears and actual risk,
with many pointing to the sensationalism of the media as the driving force behind this
discrepancy, however this is a discussion for a later paper. For now, what’s important to
take away from this is the fact that fear of terrorism continues to rise while the actual risk
remains relatively low, yet this fear outweighs most other concerns, resulting in
acceptance of security policy even at a cost to personal freedoms.
It's also important to recognize that, while risk of terrorism is relatively low in the
United States, comparatively, they are rather high on the Global Terrorism Index. The
GTI uses the Global Terrorism Database to score each country on a scale from 0 to 10;
where 0 represents no impact from terrorism and 10 represents the highest measurable
impact of terrorism, considering economic, infrastructural, and societal effects.
Unsurprisingly, Afghanistan has consistently ranked at the top of the list with a score of
9.59, followed closely by Iraq and Nigeria. The United States ranks number 29 with a
score of 5.260, the highest of any western democracies (although it is closely followed by
the UK with a score of 5.16). Turkey, meanwhile, with a score of 6.11 ranks number 18,
while New Zealand comes in at a surprising number 42 with a score of 4.33 (the 2019
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attacks significantly altered New Zealand’s rank). The GTI also reports that 2019 was the
fifth consecutive year of a decreased global impact of terrorism, so although all three
cases rank relatively highly, it’s important to reiterate that the threat of terrorism is
decreasing. Despite this, the fact that all these states exist in the top 50 in terms of risk,
accompanied by the growing fear globally, means that their respective governments have
all continued to respond with security policies and counterterrorism initiatives.
These three states (and, realistically, nearly all states) have had to grapple with
this growing fear and sense of insecurity, and all have responded with new laws and
policies aimed at countering terrorism. These range from the extreme, such as the
PATRIOT Act in the US, to the very targeted, such as the Law on Preventing Financing
of Proliferation of WMDs in Turkey, to the much milder, such as the Terrorist
Suppression Bill in New Zealand. There aren’t any states that haven’t responded to the
growing real, and perceived, threats of terrorism in some form or another, yet the extent
to which they respond may be key to the long-term effects of those actions. The argument
here then is less that any government policy of security affects support for democratic
norms, rather more that when they place it above freedoms there may be an impact on the
health of the democracy. So, by these standards New Zealand exists as a sort of best-case
scenario, with some protection but that which doesn’t extend into infringement or
restriction of rights. The US meanwhile seems to be crossing the line, so to speak, with
security being placed too high above freedom and threat blown somewhat out of
proportion, resulting in greater rights restriction and decreasing support for democracy.
Turkey then serves as the worst-case scenario, as 20 years ago it was a democracy (albeit
flawed) but harsh security policy and an intense crack-down on terrorism and suspected
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terrorist groups has led to a drastic decrease in support for norms and a complete erosion
of democracy. Clearly security threats and government responses to them alone are not
the only variable that matters or that may affect these changes, but it certainly has
potential to be one of them. All these states have had terrorist attacks, all have responded
differently, and all fall in very different places on the list of democratic strength today.
These security policies aren’t made in an attempt to curtail democracy or rights (usually),
instead they are most often made out of a very real fear for the countries safety and often
driven very strongly by popular support. The effect these policies may have on norms and
values is seemingly unintended and perhaps has only become obvious in the long term
but may pose a serious problem for the future of democracy.

Regression Analysis:
To further explore these results I used some simple regressions to test the
relationship between various variables in order to see how (and if) they strengthened my
hypothesis. Ultimately, regression analysis echoes the findings of Shin and Kim (2018),
as the data strongly indicates a significant gap between the abstract and ideal and
confirms the patterns that were emerging in the above section. The security indicators
tested all have very high chi-squares when measured against “importance of democracy,”
which is further enhanced by p-values of 5.960e-17 for “freedom vs. security,” 2.85e-146
for “security in neighborhood,” and 1.01e-187 for “worries of a terrorist attack.” These
very low p-values allow us to safely reject the null hypothesis, meaning that all these
variables, when compared with the “importance of democracy” indicator, have a
statistically significant relationship.
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Importantly, these significant relationships provide strong evidence for the
inability or unwillingness of citizens to rectify their held ideals of democracy with the
actual practice. For instance, there is very little difference between those rating freedom
or security more important in relation to how crucial they view democracy, as there is
roughly the same percentage of responses at each value, 1-10, of the perceived
importance of democracy (see Table 2). For both choices the highest percentage of
responses fall at 10, meaning democracy is absolutely important, with 47% saying
“security, and 49% saying “freedom.” This implies that citizens supporting the abstract
ideal of democracy has very little weight on their support of security over freedom (and
vice versa). Furthermore, this indicates that the decision to prioritize either one isn’t
connected to their belief in democracy’s overall importance, despite the fact that the
definition of democracy generally revolves around freedom. If people don’t see
prioritizing security as counter to their support for democracy, this could explain why
they are so accepting of government policy that restricts rights. This again points towards
findings of Shin and Kim that citizens can define democracy but don’t recognize it in
practice, and this phenomenon would explain why a clear restriction of rights isn’t
necessarily seen as antidemocratic by those living in the state, especially if they perceive
of threat to their security to be high.
Likewise, there is very little difference in terms of either how worried people are
about the threat of terrorism and how safe they feel in their neighborhood, and the
importance they assign to democracy. The vast majority of responses rank 8 and above in
abstract support of democracy across the spectrum of both worry over terrorism and
perception of security (Table 3 and 4). Just like above, this implies that people don’t
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connect how they feel about the ideal of democracy to other concepts that seem like they
should change this evaluation. For instance, this explains how the average citizen in
Turkey who’s very worried about terrorism and believes democracy is important still
overwhelmingly favors the harsh, rights restricting policies of their regime. Globally
most people support the idea of democracy, whether or not they worry about terrorism
and security, meaning they don’t, for instance, think authoritarian regimes would be
better at protecting them from terrorism or making them feel more secure in their
neighborhood.

Which is More Important- Freedom or
Security?
Freedom
Security
Total

Importance of Democracy

1.67%

1.95%

1.87%

2

0.83%

0.74%

2.64%

3

1.15%

1.14%

3.87%

4

1.86%

1.61%

5.46%

5

7.50%

6.87%

12.51%

6

6.01%

6.10%

18.58%

7

8.00%

7.96%

26.55%

8

12.41%

14.34%

40.33%

9

10.70%

11.95%

51.92%

49.86%

47.34%

100.00%

(19,889)

(48,822)

(68,711)

Not at all Important

Absolutely Important
Total
Chi-Square: 97.1373

P-Value: <0.00

Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
Table 2: Relationship Between Importance of Democracy and Security vs. Freedom
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Sense of Security in Neighborhood
Importance of
Very
Quite
Not Very
Not at all
Total
Democracy
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
Not at all Important
2.35%
1.29%
2.09%
3.72%
1.87%
2
0.79%
0.66%
0.84%
1.28%
2.64%
3
1.16%
1.12%
1.13%
1.46%
3.79%
4
1.47%
1.72%
1.96%
1.98%
5.50%
5
6.14%
6.85%
8.37%
8.99% 12.56%
6
4.94%
6.46%
6.80%
5.27% 18.60%
7
6.73%
8.67%
8.35%
6.46% 26.54%
8
12.14%
15.32%
13.45%
9.33% 40.28%
9
10.83%
12.34%
11.53%
8.90% 51.86%
Absolutely Important
53.46%
45.57%
45.46%
52.59% 100.00%
Total
(19,852)
(31,925)
(14,211)
(3,280) (69,268)
Chi-Square: 776.8551 p-value: <0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
Table 3: Relationship Between Importance of Democracy and Security in Neighborhood

Importance of Democracy
Not at all Important
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Absolutely Important
Total

Worries of A Terrorist Attack
Very
A Great
Not
Not At
Total
Much
Deal
Much
All
2.28%
1.51%
1.33%
2.33%
1.90%
0.68%
0.84%
0.86%
0.87%
2.68%
1.00%
1.31%
1.32%
1.21%
3.85%
1.54%
1.91%
1.84%
1.94%
5.59%
6.76%
7.77%
7.08%
7.39%
12.75%
5.26%
7.15%
6.56%
6.17%
18.86%
6.50%
9.17%
9.40%
7.93%
26.79%
11.73%
16.02%
15.44%
13.30%
40.55%
10.62%
12.58%
12.90%
10.89%
52.16%
53.64%
41.75%
43.27%
47.96%
100.00%
(29,042)
(17,669) (13,346)
(7,777)
(67,834)

Chi-Square: 973.3651
P-Value: <0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
Table 4: Relationship Between Importance of Democracy and Worry of a Terrorist Attack
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Finally, these relationships remain significant even when controlling for a specific
country, rather than looking at the dataset as a whole, providing further evidence that
these variables are related within each of our three cases (See Appendix A).7
Similarly, when I take all these same variables and measure them against the
perceived democraticness of the respondent’s country (testing the practice rather than
ideal) they remain significant. This means we can also conclude that a relationship exists
between perceived democracy of one’s own country and worries of a terrorist attack,
security vs. freedom, or how secure they feel in their neighborhood (See Table 5, 6, and
7). Once again, the results are akin to measuring democracy in the abstract, in that there
is not a huge degree of difference in percentage of respondents at each level, meaning
overall citizens perceptions of how democratic their country is don’t change all that much
with greater fear of terrorism, more security, etc. This indicates that, again, citizens don’t
view increased security as opposed to their own democracy, as well as provides further
evidence of their inability to connect the abstract ideal they have of democracy with the
actual reality of their country.
This further goes to show the power that the abstract ideals people hold over a
concept like democracy can have over a wide range of interrelated concepts, such as
terrorism, civil liberties, and safety. While an expanded analysis that includes many

7

The one notable exception to this is the relationship between “importance of democracy” and “worries
of a terrorist attack,” which becomes less significant when we isolate New Zealand. The regression when
controlling for New Zealand gives us a chi2 statistic of 20.5143 and a p-value of .808, meaning we are
unable to firmly state these two variables are related. When we consider how highly important new
Zealanders believe democracy to be (63% said it was “absolutely important” and 85% rated it 8 or above
in the most recent WVS), and how relatively low their worry of terrorism is (only 13% are “very” worried),
this is not all that surprising.
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How Democratically is This
Country Being Run Today?
Not at all Democratic

Which is More Important- Freedom or Security?
Freedom
Security
Total

9.22%
2
3.50%
3
5.55%
4
6.99%
5
14.91%
6
11.90%
7
14.27%
8
14.34%
9
7.33%
Completely Democratic
12%
Total
(19,762)
Chi-Square: 56.2553
P-Value:<0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)

8.80%
3.22%
5.21%
6.04%
15.59%
12.48%
14.46%
14.41%
6.74%
13.04%
(48,363)

8.92%
12.22%
17.53%
23.85%
39.24%
51.55%
65.96%
80.35%
87.26%
100%
(68,125)

Table 5: Relationship Between Perceived Democraticness of Country and Freedom vs. Security

Sense of Security in Neighborhood
Very Secure

How Democratically is
This Country Being Run
Today?
Not at all Democratic

Quite
Secure

7.93%
6.53%
2.81%
3.00%
4.34%
5.17%
5.18%
6.51%
14.11%
15.45%
10.43%
13.30%
12.80%
16.67%
14.77%
15.94%
8.14%
7.24%
Completely Democratic
19.50%
10.18%
Total
(19,565)
(31,640)
Chi-Square: 3.3e+03
P-Value:
<0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Not Very
Secure
11.86%
4.25%
6.63%
7.56%
17.10%
13.14%
12.95%
11.87%
5.36%
9.27%
(14,114)

Not at all
Secure
25.15%
4.78%
6.88%
6.79%
15.64%
9.56%
8.58%
7.87%
4.20%
10.55%
(3,241)

Total

8.91%
12.20%
17.52%
23.88%
39.29%
51.56%
65.97%
80.36%
87.33%
100.00%
(68,651)

Table 6: Relationship Between Perceived Democraticness of Country and Security in Neighborhood
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Worries of A Terrorist Attack
Very Much

A Great
Not Much Not At All Total
Deal
11.01%
7.05%
6.03%
9.23%
8.79%

How Democratically is This
Country Being Run Today?
Not at all Democratic

Completely Democratic
Total

2

3.43%

3.36%

2.86%

2.60%

11.99%

3

5.08%

5.18%

5.50%

5.16%

17.19%

4

5.93%

6.48%

6.98%

5.92%

23.47%

5

15.86%

15.49%

14.15%

14.47%

38.77%

6

11.02%

13.24%

13.84%

12.15%

51.05%

7

12.41%

16.26%

16.95%

14.56%

65.61%

8

12.87%

15.97%

16.61%

14.27%

80.18%

9

6.57%

7.32%

7.57%

7.42%

87.24%

15.82%

9.65%

9.51%

(28,805)

(17,547)

(13,290)

13.95% 100.00%
(7,735)

(67,377)

Chi-Square: 1.3e+03

P-Value:
<0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
Table 7: Relationship Between Perceived Democraticness of Country and Worry of a Terrorist
Attack

more countries would be necessary to conclusively make any claims on this preliminary
exploration of survey data, it does add further strength to our understanding of the
importance and power of citizen evaluations of norms and values. The major finding
gained from this analysis served to corroborate the findings of Shin and Kim (2018) in
revealing that there is a significant gap between the abstract and reality, and that citizens
aren’t always able to connect concepts that realistically should be connected. This is
incredibly important for this thesis, because it helps explain why citizens are so ready to
accept rights restricting security policies, even when this prioritization of security may
harm freedoms. Further, this evidence implies that citizens willing accept this trade off
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not only because they feel unsafe or perceive the threat level to be high, but also because
they are unable to comprehend what this balance actually means for their regime. This
disconnect between what democracy looks like in reality and the abstract is very
worrying if it means people don’t recognize the weakening of democratic norms that are
fundamental to their regime’s long-term survival. This dangerous behavior results in
citizens not seeing an increase in security policy as counter to democracy, in either an
abstract or practical sense, despite evidence that expanding security the way we as a
global society have been is balanced out by a decrease in freedoms. The problem is not
that citizens don’t support democracy or think a different style of regime would provide
them more safety, it’s that they can’t connect an increased sense of security with greater
restriction of fundamental rights. Or, even more worryingly, perhaps they simply don’t
care.
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CHAPTER VI
Discussion
As previous authors have noted, survey data on public support for democracy
reveals a murky, contradictory reality that changes based on the specific state and time
period studied. However, I believe some real trends have emerged in recent years,
indicating that the long-term effects of changing public opinion data perhaps were not yet
as visible in 2015-16 when most of these prior studies were conducted. In the conclusion
of their analysis Thomassen and van Ham stated that, even though they had seen a
decrease in some key indicators, “decline is certainly not long-term, but rather trends of
political support at these levels seem to follow patterns of fluctuation,” ultimately
blaming the global economic crisis for any observed changes (Thomassen and van Ham
2017, 31). However, in my analysis, using the same five-fold classification and indicators
as they did, I saw significantly more decline than their research had revealed just five
years earlier. As a reminder, the framework used to measure political support, and
thereby the political legitimacy of a regime, includes measures for the political
community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political
authorities. If all these indicators measure highly then a regime has considerable public
political support and is thus viewed as legitimate by its citizens, while if they all measure
poorly the opposite is true.
In applying this framework to my three cases some clear patterns began to
emerge, indicating something more than normal fluctuation in the data. Granted, there
was still some variation, particularly in the case of Turkey, but ultimately, there was
observable steady decline in the United States and steady increase in New Zealand, which
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is a point of departure from these earlier studies. In measuring support for the political
community I looked at national pride, which, although high in all three states, is visibly
decreasing in both Turkey and the US, while remaining steady in New Zealand. In
particular, the percentage of respondents “very proud” in the United States has dropped
below 50% for the first time since this question was asked in 1981, showing clear signs
of a steady downward trend. Likewise, and perhaps even more worryingly, support for
regime principles (measured by “importance of democracy”) is steadily decreasing in
Turkey, gradually decreasing in the US, and just slightly increasing in New Zealand.
Most concerning about this indicator is that, when viewed for all states included in the
WVS, there is a consistent pattern of decline in over one-third of them, with significantly
fewer citizens responding that democracy is “absolutely important.” This runs contrary to
many earlier studies that found the ideal of democracy to receive very high support
globally, even if democracy in practice was favoring poorly, indicating that even
democracy in the abstract is starting to decline. Again, when exploring regime
performance (measured by “democraticness of own country”), New Zealand saw a slight
increase, while the United States saw a steady decrease and Turkey remined somewhat
steady around 30%.
The measures of confidence, both of institutions and authorities, are a little less
clear. In measuring institutional confidence I looked at both parliament and parties, and
while support for parties shows some more obvious patterns, support for parliament
fluctuates a bit more. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the trend for parties in Turkey goes
opposite of what I expected, and support has actually been increasing, by even greater
rates than in New Zealand. Support for parliament meanwhile fluctuates somewhat
99

randomly in both the US and Turkey, while it steadily increases in New Zealand. If we
look at those responding that they have “no trust at all” rather than those with “a great
deal” and “quite a lot,” there is a bit more of a trend to be found. On both indicators’
citizens with no confidence at all is steadily decreasing in Turkey and steadily increasing
in the United States, presenting us with yet another question. Finally, in terms of
confidence in government we can similarly observe a significant increase in Turkey and
New Zealand and a steady decrease in the United States. Taken altogether then, it seems
very clear that public support across all measures of our framework is decreasing in the
United States, indicating that democratic legitimacy is also in danger. Contrary to this,
public support across all measures is increasing in New Zealand, revealing that they have
a robust democracy with ever growing legitimacy. The real puzzle then is Turkey, that
has both significant decreases (on political community and regime principles) and
significant increases (on regime institutions and political authorities), indicating strong
public support on some levels, and weak on other, leaving the question of legitimacy
murky.
The fact that Turkey shows positive trends on a number of indicators seems to
point towards the fact that they are not facing a legitimacy crisis, as public support
remains high. However, when we consider this in light of the fact that, ten years ago, they
were the model democracy of the region and now they are nearly a textbook autocracy,
and yet people remain supportive of the regime, it raises some questions. Despite the
gradual (and then not-so-gradual) and often very public destruction of democracy and
democratic norms, these indicators imply that the overall legitimacy of the government
remains intact, and is actually increasing, confusingly even while 60% of the population
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claims democracy is “absolutely important.” Similarly, over 28% of the population is
“completely satisfied” with the current regime (more than twice the number in the US),
which serves as yet another contradiction to the supposed importance of democracy in the
abstract. As many parts of this analysis have revealed, there is significant disconnect
between democracy in the abstract and in practice in Turkey, with other concerns taking
precedence over civil liberties when it really comes down to it. And, as Inglehart noted,
just because public support exists doesn’t mean democracy is healthy. All evidence in
Turkey points to the fact that security and the economy are the highest priorities for most
citizens and, as these were both maintained, and even improved upon, during Turkey’s
transition back to authoritarianism, the overall legitimacy of the regime didn’t suffer
much. Both physical and economic security have always been a top concern for Turkish
citizens and thus even if rights are restricted this ultimately isn’t as important a
consideration to them if their primary goal has been accomplished. Therefore, the longterm constant prioritization of security has allowed support for democratic norms to
gradually weaken as Turks remain willing to accept this tradeoff and, in turn, the
importance of these values decreases.
While this would be worrying enough if Turkey were unique in this regard, it
seems citizens in many other states have developed a very similar list of priorities. Recall
here the findings from Shin and Kim’s (2018) analysis of the Asia and Arab Barometers,
wherein they examined responses to the close-ended question of which was the most
important feature for democracy: elections, civil liberties/freedoms, economic equality, or
economic security. They found that in both the Arab and Asian Barometers, respondents
placed freedom as the least important, with economic concerns mattering nearly twice as
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much in both cases (Shin and Kim 2018). Unfortunately, this question didn’t include
physical security concerns as one of the features, however evidence from the WVS
questions on security and fear indicate that this too is an important concern to most
citizens. The point here is that, although global citizens all say democracy is important,
when it comes down to actually ranking features that are considered essential to a regime,
freedoms often fall in last place, with citizens willing to compromise on restricting these
rights if it’s accompanied by a promise of greater security.
It doesn’t matter if citizens can define democracy if they aren’t able to recognize
or understand it in practice, and if they prioritize security and economic concerns first
and foremost it’s no wonder they support a government that does the same. Even while
saying democracy is the best regime and supporting the democratic ideals behind it, in
practice it seems most citizens are very willing to give up rights under certain conditions.
This then indicates that it isn’t apathy or alienation that has turned citizens away from
supporting fundamental norms, but rather a willing acceptance. In other words, in most
cases it seems citizens aren’t frustrated or annoyed with a restriction on rights, but instead
accept this as the best way to be provided the security they crave. And while we can see
performance ratings decreasing in a number of states, WVS data indicates this has little to
do with the status of civil liberties and much more to do with the values citizens more
highly prioritize- security, the economy, rule of law, and government accountability
(Ferrín and Kriesi 2016). Citizens remain highly critical of their own regimes,
particularly those living in the strongest democracies, and yet they seem critical often of
the wrong aspects of these regimes, focusing on worries of corruption and safety over the
loss of fundamental civil liberties. This analysis has made it very clear that the way
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citizens understand, define, support, and recognize concepts like democracy, freedom and
even terrorism, differs greatly in practice and in the abstract, creating an ever growing
“democratic paradox.” More worryingly, the data observed here indicates that this
growing gap between norms and practice has helped encourage the spillover Weßels
warned of, presenting us with a potentially serious problem if true.
Dahl and his democratic paradox, Norris and her democratic deficit, Ferrín and
Kriesi and their recognition of a significant discrepancy between abstract and ideal, all
share the similar conclusion that this is noteworthy, but not ultimately a threat to
legitimacy. Some, like Weßels, note that this may become a problem in the future if a
“spillover” occurs, however most of these earlier studies are more in line with Thomassen
and van Ham’s conclusion that the “crisis myth” has been greatly exaggerated and there
is no clear evidence that democracy is truly in any danger. While these are all very
strong, well supported arguments, it seems that the state of public support may have
begun to shift since they were published, perhaps providing evidence that the fears of
Weßels are coming true. I certainly still saw a bit of fluctuation in the WVS data
observed in this analysis, particularly with the case of Turkey and their evaluation of
democracy, and in the United States with some of their confidence indicators, however, it
wasn’t anywhere near as prevalent as when the same data was observed by Thomassen
and van Ham and Ferrín and Kriesi just five years prior. Instead, there were much clearer
trends visible of a general decline in democratic support in the United States and an
increase in New Zealand, while Turkey provides some interesting puzzles for further
analysis. While the various fluctuations in this data prevent me from drawing a strict
conclusion on democratic decline, the emerging trends seem to indicate a general shift in
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the strength of democracy globally. As noted by Ferrín and Kriesi, part of the reason they
couldn’t conclude there was global democratic decline was that democratic strength
varied somewhat by region and by state, which is exactly what I found. However, I
wanted to take it further and examine a possible cause for this variation that might
explain why only some states were seeing significant decline in recent years, and that is
where the debate between security and freedom comes into play.
It’s clear from the WVS data that democracy is fairing very differently in
different states, but with somewhat consistent trends either of decline or growth- what
could account for this discrepancy? Recognizing that there are likely multiple forces at
work, I set out to explore a particularly tricky one that threatens all states, and thus
they’ve all had to address in some way or another with policy changes. With
globalization, rising nationalism, and the rising confidence of radical religious groups, the
past few decades have seen international terrorism become a globally shared threat and a
growing fear for most citizens. Despite the fact that terrorist acts have actually decreased
since a peak in 2014/5 when ISIL was at their strongest, fear remains persistently high,
further encouraged by heavy media coverage of any event that could be connected to
terrorism. The attacks on 9/11 introduced a new era of fear, as they illustrated that no
one, not even the strongest, most influential countries, were safe, and made terrorism an
international issue, rather than something that only happened in impoverished or war-torn
states abroad. Furthermore, the September 11th attacks were the deadliest in human
history and thus this devastation justifiably changed the way we understood and
combatted the terrorist threat.
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This is made abundantly clear in the WVS analysis of terrorism and security
issues discussed in the above section. Of the 49 states asked to choose between freedom
and security, only three responded that freedom was more important, and two of them
very narrowly (Australia and New Zealand). This is despite the fact that over half those
included were states that are generally defined as either a “democracy” or a “flawed
democracy” and the recognized fact that one of these principles most often comes at the
cost of the other. There were numerous studies done immediately following 9/11 that
found Americans to be very willing to give up some civil liberties if it came with a
promise of safety, and it seems this general “rally round the flag” sentiment has persisted
long after that attack and is reflected in many other states besides. All three cases in my
study have seen devastating terrorist attacks, and all are ranked in the top 50 of the
Global Terrorism Index, and while a state like Turkey faces more consistent and everpresent risk than the other two, they’ve all had to deal with this trade-off, and all have
done so differently.
In New Zealand, the government enacted new terrorism policy after 9/11, and
then expanded it further after the 2019 Christchurch attacks, however they always
maintained civil liberties as a top priority. In Turkey meanwhile the government cracked
down harshly on most fundamental democratic freedoms in an effort to prevent further
terror attacks, and eventually began using these restrictions as a targeted political tool. In
the United State the government initially reacted to 9/11 with very intense anti-terrorism
policy, which has since been softened somewhat, but still is too extreme and broad for the
threat actually faced by the country. This is perhaps one of the biggest differences
between these various state’s terrorism policies: the scope and intended target. In both
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Turkey and the US the scope is broad and at times vaguely defined, so the laws can be
stretched to cover a wide range of situations and individuals. They also have been used in
a very individually targeted way, as anti-Kurdish policy in Turkey and anti-Muslim
policy in the US (even though neither government would admit to this). Meanwhile in
New Zealand, even in the wake of devastation following the Christchurch attack, the
government responded very carefully, and rather than enacting broad sweeping terrorism
reform, specifically targeted the weapon used. This allowed them to provide safety to
their citizens without targeting a group of specific people and maintaining the freedoms
the citizens enjoyed (although there was some minor protest by gun “rights” groups).
When it comes down to practice, people will nearly always prioritize safety over
freedoms. At this fundamental level it’s purely biology that makes us put survival and
self-preservation first and foremost; the worry is how this may affect democracy in the
long-term. If fear of terrorism isn’t decreasing and citizens remain accepting of this
compromise to their civil liberties, how does this change the way they view and support
democracy over time? The analysis done here indicates that support for democratic norms
is decreasing in states where security has been consistently prioritized, so much so that in
states that have fully committed to security over freedoms, such as Turkey, support has
started to increase again, despite the fact that the regime is no longer democratic at all. In
this instance it seems the state has prioritized security so strongly, for so long, that the
people, even while saying they believe democracy is the best regime and further, that
they themselves have a strong democracy, no longer really support fundamental
democratic values. This is clear in the rising support for an unaccountable leader and the
steady decrease in their belief free elections are important, civil liberties protect them,
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and that women and men should have the same rights, as well as in the overall decline in
the “importance of democracy” in the past 3 waves of the WVS. This also serves as
further evidence that citizens decreasing support for democratic values isn’t done out of
apathy or frustration with the system, but rather it is a very willing and conscious choice
made for the sake of security (or at least the perception of it).
Worryingly, a similar trend may be beginning to occur in the United States, as
indicated by the steadily declining support for a wide range of democratic norms. As the
available evidence makes clear, fear of terrorism remains very high in the United States,
and has since the devastation of 9/11, even while the actual threat of terrorism has
decreased. During this same time period belief in the importance of democracy has also
been gradually declining, accompanied by an even faster decline in the perceived
democraticness of the United States by American citizens. Simultaneously feelings of
national pride and confidence in both institutions and in the government have been
decreasing, indicating that, when taken all together, the democratic legitimacy of the US
is in danger. The regime doesn’t have the full support of the citizens and the longer this
persists the more of a danger to democratic survival it will be. Furthermore, the negative
performance ratings of the government and institutions has indeed begun to spillover onto
the way citizens evaluate fundamental norms, as most obviously observed in the decline
in people answering that democracy is “absolutely essential.” This is also apparent in the
rising support for an unaccountable leader (38% believe this to be “good” or “very good,”
whereas 24% believed this in 1998), which runs counter to a number of democratic
values. Likewise, there has been a slight decline in belief that civil rights protect people
from repression, with 57% now stating this is “absolutely essential,” down from 62% in
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2009. Fortunately, on a number of other indicators- both free and fair elections and the
belief that men and women are equal- response have remained steadily at 70% saying this
is “essential” over the past three waves. This seems to indicate that, although a spillover
onto norms has been realized, it hasn’t yet reached every corner of democratic norms, as
some values still remain supported, even as others are steadily declining. While this is
certainly a positive, it does add a sense of urgency to “solving” this spillover before it
sinks deeper into society and moves the United States further into hybridity.
Previous studies were indeed correct that democratic decline isn’t a universally
occurring phenomenon (yet), however it does seem to follow specific trends of increase
and decrease depending on the state and their specific circumstance and, as this study
indicates, their policy prioritization. In the aftermath of 9/11 the world reevaluated their
approach to international terrorism and, with levels of fear drastically heightened across
all sectors of society, began to more highly prioritize security over civil liberties.
Terrorism is of course a very real threat and has affected all three of these states in
devastating ways which is not a fact I’m trying to counter. Instead, I want to make clear
that this changing environment, both literally and in citizens perceptions, may explain
why people are open to rights being restricted. The degree to which this occurs then may
in turn help explain why democracy is decreasing on a global scale. People are clearly
scared, and increasingly growing more so in spite of evidence that the actual threat of
terrorism has decreased, and thus put their security interests above freedom. The
government in turn responds to citizen desire for safety and, due to the heightened
perception of threat, even if they cross the line in restricting rights (whether intentional or
unintentional), there will be little protest. The greatest danger here is the extent or degree
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to which governments choose to prioritize security seems to then have long-term effects
on the strength of democratic norms as, over time, people accept that these rights are
unnecessary or unimportant, particularly if they perceive their safety to be at risk.
Furthermore, the above analysis also makes clear that, in general, people don’t see this
prioritization as in any way counter to their support of democracy and thus can justify
this trade-off without compromising their belief in democracy’s importance. It’s not that
citizens no longer view democracy as “the only game in town,” it’s that they have lost an
ability to even explain what the rules of the game are. Over time it seems this has eroded
support for fundamental democratic values in states that have more heavily placed
security first and where the sense of threat is high, resulting in a gradual decline of
democratic legitimacy and an increased support for autocracy in practice.
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CHAPTER VII
Conclusion
Taken as a whole this analysis makes several things clear. First, there is a growing
gap between reality and ideal in citizens perception of democracy as a concept, as well as
within a number of specific democratic norms. Secondly, both performance ratings and
evaluations of democracy’s overall importance are declining in many states, but not in all
of them and not in all of them equally. In particular this analysis reveals that the United
States is decreasing on nearly every indicator of democracy, while New Zealand is
increasing and Turkey presents more of an enigma, with some decreases and some
increases. More specifically, support for democratic norms such as free and fair elections
and civil liberties is decreasing in Turkey, as is the overall importance of democracy
(although it still remains relatively high), while confidence in institutions and satisfaction
with the regime itself increase. Ultimately this data thus reveals three important
relationships:
1. Support for all measures of democracy are decreasing in Turkey and support
for the current (authoritarian) regime is increasing
2. Support for all measures of democracy are increasing in New Zealand and
support for the current (democratic) regime is increasing
3. Support for all measures of democracy are slowly decreasing in the US and
support for the current (democratic) regime is decreasing
What could explain this? How has the world changed in the past two decades that
could be encouraging these trends? While certainly many factors are involved in this
pattern, this analysis explored if the ongoing debate between security and freedom plays a
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role, particularly when it comes to prioritizing one at the expense of the other. If so, this
could account for some of the variation by country and region that previous authors
noted, as different states found a different balance of priorities. Furthermore, the growing
gap between reality and ideal in citizens perception (the “democratic paradox”) could
then help explain why citizens may be accepting of rights restricting policy if they don’t
see it as opposed to their democratic ideal.
The evidence indicates that, rather than a global decline, we see some
democracies weakening while others are strengthening, with enough regimes’ fitting
either condition that it is ill advised to overlook or to explain away by claiming it is
“normal fluctuation” in the data. While not all democracies are declining, there is a very
serious trend of decreasing support for the abstract ideal of democracy that could have
much greater implications in the future. Furthermore, the growing gap between reality
and democracy in the ideal is worrying. This discrepancy indicates that citizens have a
picture or understanding of what democracy is that does not match the regime they have
(or wish to have), and the more this grows the greater the impact on decreasing
performance evaluations will be. As evaluations of regime performance continue to
decline this begins to affect support for fundamental democratic norms as they too begin
to lose support. This trend is then further exacerbated by the security environment and
ever-present sense of threat felt by the majority of citizens that encourages a prioritization
of security policy at the expense of civil liberties. Altogether this means that fundamental
norms that provide a foundation to democracy are losing support both because citizens no
longer view them as important and because they no longer support the regime that these
values have built.
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The data examined reveals that fear of terrorism is very high and increasing in
Turkey and this has led the government to aggressively prioritize security policy over
freedoms. Meanwhile, fear of terrorism is lower in New Zealand and relatively stable,
and the government has taken great effort to respond by strictly maintaining freedoms as
a top priority and safety as a distant second. Finally, fear of terrorism is high,
overexaggerated, and increasing in the United States and the government has, at least in
the abstract, tried to balance security and freedom, but in practice leans much more
heavily towards security. Connecting these facts together makes it therefore clear that this
government decision of either freedom or security prioritization has had long term effects
on citizen support for fundamental norms, both positive and negative. Thus, we see a
state that aggressively pursued security and restricted civil rights experience a drastic
decrease in support for democratic norms, to the extent that it no longer even qualifies as
a democracy. Conversely, a state that carefully ensured freedoms were always a top
priority has experienced an increase in support for democratic norms and now exists as
one of the strongest and most stable democracies. Finally, we have a state that initially
strongly prioritized security but then rolled it back some now experiencing a gradual
decrease in support for some democratic norms (notably not all of them) and now exists
as a flawed democracy, or potentially even a hybrid regime. We can safely conclude from
this that, in terms of policy prioritization and democratic strength, Turkey exists as the
worst-case scenario, New Zealand as the best, and the United States as risky mid-level
scenario.
One of the most interesting surprises in the data was the fact that Turks have high
degrees of confidence in their nondemocratic, increasingly corrupt system, even while
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they also say that democracy is important. It’s true the percentage of respondents saying
democracy is important has been steadily decreasing in Turkey, however it is still over
50% and more Turks think they live in a democracy than Americans do. It seems the state
has prioritized security for so long that the people, even while claiming they believe
democracy is the best regime and that they themselves have a strong democracy, no
longer actually support fundamental democratic norms. While this is further powerful
evidence of the disconnect between reality and ideals, it also reveals that legitimacy
remains relatively high in Turkey despite the regime’s transition away from democracy.
This implies that, in the grand scheme of things, the restriction of rights is not as
important in performance and confidence assessments as security, and thus doesn’t play
as much of a role in how citizens evaluate their own government and regime. This is
crucial because it indicates that citizens are accepting of freedoms being restricted and, as
a similar trend is visible in a number of states, provides evidence that citizens are
perfectly willing to turn away from supporting democratic norms under the right
conditions.
This idea has some very serious implications when thinking about policy making
and how easily public opinion can be altered. No matter how important citizens say
democracy is to them, this analysis reveals that they will very willingly turn away from
these norms if they perceive it to be in their best interest to do so. The idea that citizens
have an internalized list of priorities that rarely actually puts the democratic norms they
claim to be crucial first is a troubling one indeed. Security and safety will always be a top
priority for citizens, and thus, to an extent, any policy or act that claims to provide this is
likely to be accepted, especially if introduced into an environment of fear, such as
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following a terrorist act or some other sort of crisis. While the implications of this are bad
enough, particularly if this knowledge is used with ill will by political elites, even more
worrying are the unintentional long-term effects. It seems that the longer and more
aggressively a state prioritizes security, the greater the effect on democratic norms as
citizens lose all support for these values, ultimately putting the democracy itself at risk.
This is not to claim that these policy choices alone are what caused the failure of the
Turkish democratic project, or other failed and flawed democracies like it, for obviously
many factors are at play in these scenarios. What’s most worrying about this
prioritization however is the way that it makes these fundamental norms seem
unimportant, or even dangerous for a state to have, thereby deeply impacting how
citizens view and understand democracy in the long run.
This also makes it clear that the states we need to worry about are the “mid-level”
scenario ones that fall somewhere in the middle of the balance and are the most at risk for
experiencing further decline. States that have tried to balance this trade off in a middle
gray area could too easily tip either way on the scale under the right conditions, leaving
the state in a murky identity crisis of sorts as legitimacy straddles a very fine line. The US
is of course a perfect example of this, as over time we have drifted further from a strong
democracy and deeper into hybridity. As this analysis made clear, enough values are still
supported in the United States that we aren’t in immediate danger of legitimacy crisis, but
there are some very worrying trends to look out for, particularly in terms of confidence in
institutions. Furthermore, and very worryingly, the overexaggerated fear and sense of
threat Americans feel make it far too easy for further rights restricting policy to be passed
and accepted by the public. The US is somewhat unique in this regard, due particularly to
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the sensationalism of our news media, however a number of other states that have
struggled with this balance may also be at risk of falling deeper into hybridity, as
indicated by decreasing scores on the WVS indicator of democratic importance and
dropping Freedom House scores. In particular, a number of Eastern European states
(Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary) and Mediterranean states (Greece, Italy) have been seeing
consistent decreases in recent years which could perhaps partly be explained by their
struggle to balance security and freedom in regions facing various security threats.
Further research into these states and the values they have prioritized would be
fascinating and could provide even stronger evidence to support my argument.
Meanwhile, states such as New Zealand and the Nordic states that have
consistently and passionately prioritized freedom above all else exist as the best-case
scenario in terms of democratic strength today. Even when faced with a serious security
threat New Zealand maintained it’s previous prioritization and only enacted new policy
that very specifically targeted the weapons and hate speech used and avoided ever
making it about “us vs. them.” Even more interestingly, in terms of citizen perceptions of
safety, New Zealand’s approach seems to have been more successful when looking
strictly at the numbers. In reflecting on feelings of security in their neighborhood, New
Zealander’s perception of safety has increased, in spite of the 2019 terrorist attack, while
both Turks and Americans feelings of neighborhood security decreased by over 50%
between the past two waves of the WVS. Like every other country asked the question in
the WVS, New Zealand recorded an increase in the “fear of a terrorist attack” indicator
over the past few waves, however the total responses for those either “very much” or “a
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great deal” afraid is still only around 30%, while it is over 60% in the US, and over 90%
in Turkey.
People everywhere are worried about terrorism, but even more so in the countries
with harsher security policy, perhaps indicating that Cole and Dempsey’s (2014)
conclusion that security vs. freedom is a “false trade-off” may have some weight to it.
They note that it’s often unquestionably accepted that the threat of terrorism requires that
we “alter the constitutional balance” that “antiterrorism measures infringing civil liberties
will work,” but that in reality there is little evidence to support this (Cole and Dempsey
2014, 240). Instead, many of these counterterrorism measures (in particular they discuss
the Patriot Act) actually end up being counterproductive and doing much more harm than
good because curtailing civil liberties doesn’t necessarily enhance security. This is
troubling, for whenever civil liberties groups raise concerns over provisions of security
policy, it is most often justified by supporters saying some compromise is necessary in
order for the state to be safe. However, if this is indeed a false trade-off, states are
unnecessarily giving up freedoms they could have maintained, meaning much of the
democratic decline attributed to this could have been avoided. Future research into how
effective security policy such as the Patriot Act actually are in the long-term would be
necessary to fully make this claim, however it remains a very interesting, and worrying,
line of reasoning. It seems, either knowingly or subconsciously, the New Zealand
government understood this, refusing to compromise on freedoms to provide safety,
whereas governments in the US and Turkey were willing and even happy to do so.
The balance between security and freedom is not an easy one (and as Cole and
Dempsey argue, it shouldn’t have to be a balance at all) and these governments aren’t
116

entirely to blame for the long-term effects this decision had. As this analysis makes clear,
in many instance citizens were happy to have rights restricted if it came with a promise of
security, and thus human survival nature is just as much at fault as governmental policy
makers. Further, the goal of this analysis is not to point the blame at anyone, but rather to
explore what may account for the fluctuation and variation in support for democratic
norms and, in turn, for the decline in democracy we can observe in select regions and
states. It’s also important to note that the argument here isn’t that these security policy
choices are “bad” or “good,” rather they have had potentially unintended consequences
on the overall health of democracy. Turkey has a serious problem with terrorism, there is
no denying that, and they obviously have to take some sort of action against this with
greater security policies. So, they haven’t necessarily made a mistake in doing so,
however these choices may have had much more serious consequences in terms of
support for democracy in the country. Likewise, the attacks on 9/11 in the US were a
national tragedy and there was huge support and push for the government to act against
terrorism, so they weren’t mistaken in trying to do something, but the reach of the Patriot
Act went too far.
Responses to terrorism should be made in proportion to the risk the state faces,
but also with a clear understanding that harsher security policy may go hand in hand with
greater restrictions on civil liberties. New Zealand, like the rest of the world, responded
to 9/11, and later the Christchurch attacks in their own country, with new and updated
security policy, but they were very careful to keep from going overboard and maintained
their prioritization of civil liberties throughout the legislation process. Meanwhile, the
United States clearly overstepped, as indicated by the many attempts and successes to roll
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back the reach of PATRIOT in the following years, even though an amended form of the
bill continues to exist. Likewise, Turkey, while certainly a high-risk state, fully
committed to security over all else, and has even taken advantage of this risk, to make
policy that sharply restricts rights and very specifically targets Kurdish citizens in
response to PKK affiliated attacks.
When a government makes the choice to prioritize security, it’s unlikely they do it
knowing how support for fundamental democratic norms will change. In most instances
this seems to be an unintended consequence of the fear and tension in society and an
opportunity, or even need, for the government to pass stronger policy. There are of course
situations like Turkey, wherein Erdoğan took advantage of the fear in society to further
consolidate power around himself, but even then, it seems unlikely that his ultimate goal
was to make Turkish citizens no longer even believe that these fundamental democratic
norms were important. These findings are critical, for they show how easily public
support can change over time within certain environments and how detrimental security
prioritization is for the survival of democracy. If security policy and humankinds’
inherent need for safety is inadvertently weakening democracy, it is an understatement to
say we have a major problem on our hands. Although the global threat of terrorism has
decreased since 2015/16 and the peak of ISIL’s power, there’s no knowing what we may
face next. The world is a rapidly changing place, and new threats emerge every day that
require governments to make a decision on priority. For instance, a particularly apt
example is the coronavirus pandemic that we’re only now starting to see the end of. In
early 2020, as the world began to realize how serious this threat was, governments in
every type of regime began to take away freedoms and suspend certain civil liberties in
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an effort to provide safety to their people. Freedom of movement and assembly were lost,
states of emergency were imposed, elections were cancelled or postponed, educational
and cultural establishments were closed, and public protests were prohibited, altogether
creating what sounds like a very dystopian reality. This is in no way to argue these
weren’t right or necessary measures to take, or that they weren’t met by protest from
certain sectors of the population, just to point out that, in general, these harsh, rights
restricting measures were willingly accepted by the public. It may seem odd to compare a
global pandemic to the threat of terrorism, but I think both illustrate the point that citizens
are going to put safety first, even if it comes at the expense of democratic norms. Now
the policies enacted in response to the pandemic are, of course, temporary, and thus most
likely won’t have long-term effects on support for these values, but it would certainly be
interesting to come back to this idea in a few years’ time to fully examine what effect
these pandemic measures have had.
Future research needs to focus on how public opinion changes over time, rather
than looking at the immediate effect of a crisis or political event. The idea that a policy
enacted 20 years ago can still have a role to play in how citizens understand what values
are important in a democracy is a critical takeaway from this thesis. This theory has
many potential applications in the field of political science, and I think a much larger
study that focuses on more states and perhaps even more types of policy could strengthen
these findings and introduce even more avenues for research. Public opinion is clearly a
crucial component of democratic strength and can’t be overlooked or just assumed in
future studies. It plays a real role in legitimacy and in the long-term survival of
democracy and we must understand this and take it into consideration when questioning
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why some democracies are surviving while so many others fail. Further, prioritizing
security policy is clearly harmful to democracy, not only in that it comes at the cost of
certain freedoms, but also in how it fundamentally affects how citizens understand these
norms, increasing the risk of long-term damage. Especially if one follows Cole and
Dempsey’s line of reasoning, many of these harsh security policies are ultimately
unnecessary and do more harm than good and thus we must recognize this risk before
implementing ever increasing security measures.
Governments can’t stop people from being afraid of terrorism, but they can do
more to accurately convey the true level of threat a country faces and take more specific
action against it, such as New Zealand and Australia have done with firearms.
Furthermore, the media plays a significant role in sensationalizing terrorist acts and
encouraging the spread of fear and, while any sort of media control is a gargantuan, if not
impossible, task (not to mention potentially un-democratic), we must be better at
recognizing fact and fiction. Future terrorism policy needs to be more carefully drafted in
proportion to the threat the country actually faces and with consideration of what
governments are asking citizens to give up in exchange for a perception of security, as
well as a recognition of what the long-term consequences may be. Citizens themselves
also need to be aware that this tradeoff exists and what the cost of the security they are
demanding truly is. Of course, these are easy said than done, and in many countries the
wounds run deep and will require a great deal of healing to strengthen support for
democracy, however recognizing these facts is the first step to a cure. Global democracy
as a whole is not yet at risk, but, in specific states that have made specific policy choices

120

the threat is much more salient, particularly in the long-term. State security is key to state
survival, but it shouldn’t have to come at the expense of freedom.
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Appendix A: Regressions and P-Values
As noted in the regression analysis above, nearly all of the relationships explored remain
significant when we control for country. Following are all the Chi2 Statistics by country for each
relationship, and the associated p-value.
If the p-value is less than or equal to .05 we can reject the null hypothesis that there is no
relationship between the variables. P-values that we cannot reject, meaning we can’t confirm
that there is a relationship between variables, are highlighted.
Demimport x fear_terror: (p= 1.01e-187)
-

Turk: 273.9553

[p=1.066e-42]

-

Nwzld: 20.5143 [p=.80849522]

-

USA: 82.7472

[p=1.438e-07]

Demimport x secure: (p= 2.85e-146)
-

Turk: 110.3075 [p=4.925e-12]

-

Nwzld: 109.3106 [p=7.256e-12]

-

USA: 90.8913

[p=7.653e-09]

Demimport x free_v_secure: (p= 5.96e-17)
-

Turk: 44.2144

-

Nwzld: 12.9711

-

USA: 84.7674

[p=1.289e-06]
[p=.16391832]
[p=1.816e-14]

Demcntry x fear_terror: (p= 4.42e-257)
-

Turk: 138.1645

[p=6.950e-17]

-

Nwzld: 44.7917

[p=.01710244]

-

USA: 80.5039

[p=3.167e-07]

Demcntry x secure: (p=<0.000)
-

Turk: 159.6445

[p=8.910e-21]

-

Nwzld: 83.3470 [p=1.163e-07]

-

USA: 176.0887

[p=8.017e-24]

Demcntry x free_v_secure: (p= 7.015e-09)
-

Turk: 92.4798

[p=5.171e-16]

-

Nwzld: 14.2936 [p=.1122579]

-

USA: 27.3806

[p=.00120967]
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Country Isolation Regressions
Perceived Democraticness of Country x Sense of Security in Neighborhood:

Sense of Security in Neighborhood
How Democratically is This Country
Very
Quite
Not Very Not at all Total
Being Run Today?
Secure Secure Secure
Secure
Not at all Democratic
2.58% 1.90%
8.53%
11.76%
3.59%
2 3.09% 2.02%
4.05%
7.35%
6.27%
3 3.09% 6.01%
10.02%
8.82% 12.93%
4 4.12% 9.86%
8.53%
11.76% 22.10%
5 7.22% 14.89%
14.50%
17.65% 36.41%
6 9.79% 13.53%
16.20%
10.29% 50.07%
7 21.13% 17.64%
11.94%
10.29% 66.63%
8 18.04% 19.22%
12.15%
10.29% 84.05%
9 12.37% 7.33%
6.82%
7.35% 91.70%
Completely Democratic
18.56% 7.52%
7.25%
4.41% 100.00%
Total
194
1,582
469
68
2,313
Chi-Square: 159.6445
P-Value: <0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)

TURKEY

Sense of Security in Neighborhood
How Democratically is This Country
Very
Quite
Not
Not at all Total
Being Run Today?
Secure Secure Very
Secure
Secure
Not at all Democratic
2.07% 1.67%
4.65%
15.38%
2.25%
2
0.30% 0.74%
1.16%
0.00%
2.86%
3
1.48% 1.85%
6.98%
7.69%
5.11%
4
1.48% 2.78%
2.33%
7.69%
7.46%
5
5.92% 9.07%
13.95%
15.38% 15.96%
6
3.55% 8.33%
10.47%
7.69% 22.82%
7 11.83% 16.48%
17.44%
15.38% 37.76%
8 28.70% 30.74%
26.74%
15.38% 67.24%
9 24.85% 19.26%
4.65%
7.69% 86.99%
Completely Democratic
19.82% 9.07%
11.63%
1.69% 100.00%
Total
338
540
86
13
977
Chi-Square: 83.3470
P-Value: <0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
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UNITED STATES

Sense of Security in Neighborhood

How Democratically is This
Country Being Run Today?
Not at all Democratic

Very
Quite
Not Very Not at all
Total
Secure
Secure
Secure
Secure
5.96%
3.02%
5.61%
17.39%
4.69%
2

1.32%

2.65%

3.82%

2.17%

7.53%

3

5.63%

4.79%

7.26%

15.22%

13.57%

4

4.97%

7.60%

9.81%

7.61%

21.54%

5

10.60%

16.81%

23.31%

22.83%

39.84%

6

1.92%

13.86%

13.38%

5.43%

53.02%

7

22.85%

21.31%

15.41%

9.78%

72.27%

8

13.91%

19.10%

11.85%

8.70%

88.13%

9

10.26%

6.05%

4.97%

5.43%

94.32%

12.58%

4.79%

4.59%

5.43% 100.00%

302

1,356

785

Completely Democratic
Total

92

2,535

P-Value: <0.00

Chi-Square: 176.0887

Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)

Perceived Democraticness of Country x Worry of a Terrorist Attack:

TURKEY
How Democratically is This
Country Being Run Today?
Not at all Democratic
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Completely Democratic
Total

Worries of A Terrorist Attack
Very
A Great
Not
Not At
Total
Much
Deal
Much
All
5.99%
1.28%
2.14%
11.63%
3.59%
3.40%
2.36%
1.43%
0.00%
6.24%
7.69%
5.51%
5.71%
11.63% 12.82%
6.89%
10.33% 13.21%
2.33% 21.88%
10.89%
18.01% 17.14%
0.00% 36.41%
12.49%
14.96% 13.57%
11.63% 50.09%
16.58%
16.14% 15.71%
23.26% 66.50%
16.68%
19.29% 14.64%
9.30% 83.94%
7.59%
7.38%
8.21%
9.30% 91.55%
11.79%
4.72%
8.21%
20.93%
100.00
%
1,001
1,016
280
43
2,340

Chi-Square: 138.1645
P-Value: <0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
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Worries of A Terrorist Attack

How Democratically is This
Country Being Run Today?
Not at all Democratic

Very Much

Completely Democratic
Total
Chi-Square: 44.7917

A Great
Not
Not At
Total
Deal
Much
All
5.51%
2.03%
1.10%
3.24%
2.28%

2

0.79%

1.02%

0.66%

0.54%

3.01%

3

0.79%

4.06%

2.41%

1.62%

5.39%

4

3.15%

2.54%

2.19%

2.16%

7.77%

5

15.75%

7.61%

6.14%

9.19%

16.06%

6

7.09%

8.63%

5.70%

7.03%

22.80%

7

11.02%

19.29%

14.91%

12.43%

37.62%

8

22.05%

29.95%

33.11%

28.65%

67.78%

9

17.32%

14.72%

22.15%

19.46%

87.26%

16.54%

10.15%

11.62%

15.68% 100.00%

127

197

456

185

965

P-Value: 0.0171

Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)

Worries of A Terrorist Attack
How Democratically is This
Very Much A Great
Not
Not At
Total
Country Being Run Today?
Deal
Much
All
Not at all Democratic
6.87%
3.77%
3.03%
10.87%
4.70%
2
2.72%
2.28%
3.43%
3.62%
7.51%
3
5.59%
5.75%
6.20%
9.42% 13.56%
4
6.55%
8.72%
8.18%
7.97% 21.54%
5
21.57%
17.64%
17.02%
15.22% 39.83%
6
11.82%
12.09%
15.57%
12.32% 52.91%
7
14.54%
20.12%
22.16%
19.57% 72.23%
8
14.70%
18.24%
14.64%
10.87% 88.11%
9
6.39%
6.64%
5.80%
5.07% 94.35%
Completely Democratic
9.27%
4.76%
3.96%
5.07% 100.00%
Total
626
1,009
758
138
2,531
Chi-Square: 80.5039
P-Value: <0.00
Source: World Values Survey- Wave 7 (2017-2020)
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Figure 1.5- Importance of Democracy: Full Results
Source: 2005-2020 World Values Survey
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Appendix B: Graphs of Full Data
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Figure 2.5- “Democraticness” of Own Country: Full Results
Source: 2005-2020 World Values Survey
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Figure 4.5- Satisfaction with Political System: Full Results
Source: 2017-2020 World Values Survey

2

New Zealand

14.7%
6

15.6%
7

9.8%

20.3%
13.2%

United States

18.5%
8

6.5%

14.9%

10.7%

SATISFACTION WITH POLITICAL SYSTEM: FULL RESULTS

5.8%
9

1.4%

4.3%

COMPLETELY
SATISFIED

3.6%
2.1%

2.6%

SECURITY VS. FREEDOM: GLOBAL RESPONSES
Secur

Freedom

28.3%
United States
69.5%
86.3%
Egypt
12.6%
65.9%
Ukraine
29.5%
59.0%
Turkey
39.1%
80.0%
Tunisia
17.8%
68.1%
Thailand
31.0%
65.7%
Tajikistan
34.3%
71.4%
Zimbabwe
28.3%
67.6%
Vietnam
32.4%
43.4%
Serbia
54.5%
Russia
72.0%
23.5%
64.5%
Romania
33.8%
Puerto Rico
75.3%
23.8%
68.3%
Philippines
31.6%
82.9%
Peru
15.7%
53.9%
Pakistan
44.4%
71.3%
Nigeria
28.0%
65.3%
Nicaragua
34.7%
42.0% 47.3%
New Zealand
72.3%
Mexico
27.4%
71.9%
Malaysia
28.1%
80.7%
Macau SAR
18.8%
72.3%
Lebanon
25.8%
62.3%
Kyrgyzstan
36.4%
57.1%
South Korea
42.9%
89.7%
Jordan
9.6%
68.5%
Kazakhstan
26.5%
82.1%
Japan
13.6%
89.2%
Iraq 9.8%
84.5%
Iran
14.9%
95.2%
Indonesia
4.5%
76.1%
23.4%
Hong Kong SAR
73.8%
Guatemala
24.8%
44.9% 54.8%
Greece
53.4%
Germany
43.2%
67.2%
Ethiopia
32.7%
76.0%
Ecuador
23.4%
66.5%
31.0%
Cyprus
67.4%
Colombia
32.6%
85.8%
Taiwan SAR
13.7%
92.7%
China
7.1%
65.6%
Chile
30.9%
88.6%
Myanmar
11.4%
71.9%
Brazil
24.4%
82.9%
Bolivia
15.7%
72.2%
Bangladesh
27.3%
46.5% 51.2%
Australia
65.9%
Argentina
33.6%
63.1%
Andorra
36.5%
0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Figure 13.5- Freedom vs. Security: Global Responses; Source: 2017-2020 World Values Survey
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